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ABSTRACT

This thesis provides a multidisciplinary analysis of
the circumstances which surrounded the successful imposition
of a countervailing duty on whole Canadian groundfish, and
indicates what implications this action may have for the
future. First, it will situate the countervailing duty
investigation in terms of its relationship with U.S.
statutes. and also with the Nation's international oblig&--tions. Then, the impact of the duty is examined to see how
it might affect a potential free trade agreement with
Canada. Similarly, the thesis projects what effect the duty
will have in establishing a precedent, and assesses the
likelihood of imposing similar duties on other imported
seafood products. Finally, the actual case is presented in
detail, so as to reveal what constituted an illegal
"subsidy," and to explain what "material injury· meant in
this instance.
Upon conclusion, it will become evident that
fundamental inadequacies currently exist in both the U.S .
countervailing duty statutes and the international agreements from which the U.S. statutes are derived. Furthermore,
significant discrepancies exist between these two interrelated bodies of law. Therefore, it is likely that the
current countervailing duty legislation will need to be
amended.
ii

The investigation will probably not provide a great
deal of assistance in analyzing the possibility of imposing
countervailing duties on other fish products. While it
further clarified the meaning of an illegal "subsidy," and
illustrated one instance where "material injury" was
present. other questions remained unanswered. Inevitably,
each case will possess its own nuances. Because of the
complexity and flexibility of the legislation, predicting
the outcome of a case will remain subject to uncertainty .
uncertainty will also surround the free trade negotiations between Canada and the United States. Because New
England fishermen stand to "lose out" in such an arrangement, the countervailing duty will probably be employed as a
"bargaining chip" in the negotiations.
In actuality, the imposition of a duty on Canadian
groundfish resulted in very few positive implications.
Rather, it served to illustrate that the competitive
position of the U.S. fishing industry is eroding. Unless
changes are instituted by both the U.S. industry and by the
government, competition from imports is likely to increase,
with or without a countervailing duty.

iii
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Introduction

American fishermen have long complained about the
effects of allegedly subsidized or unfair competition from
foreign seafood in the United States market. However,
efforts to secure relief from these imports have
historically met with limited success. The most recent
effort was initiated on behalf of the North Atlantic
Fisheries Task Force (N.A.F.T.F.) on August 5, 1985, in
response to the importation of fresh Canadian groundfish.
The petition resulted in the imposition of a

5.82~ ~

valorem duty on whole fish. This thesis will examine the
countervailing duty (CVD) investigation which occurred for
the purpose of answering the following questions :

(I) How does the groundfish CVD investigation relate to, or
comply with, the evolution of the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (GATT), and U.S. countervailing duty
legislation?

(II) What effect will the countervailing duty have on U.S. Canadian political relations, especially in light of a
potential bilateral free trade arrangement?

-2-

(III) What effect will the outcome of the groundfish CVD
case have on the possibility of U.S. fishermen securing
relief from other imported seafood products?

(IV) Why did the North Atlantic Fisheries Task Force file
the countervailing duty petition. despite previous
failures?

(V) What did the International Trade Administration (ITA)
consider to be a countervailable "subsidy" in its final
decision?

(VI) How did the International Trade Commission (ITC) reach
its final "material injury" determination?

Each of these questions will be addressed separately in
a subsequent chapter . It is apparent from reading them that
the actual case against Canadian groundfish will constitute
the foundation of this thesis. However, several other important topics will simultaneously be developed around this
foundation. Such an approach is, perhaps, characteristic of
the study of Marine Affairs, which frequently addresses an
ocean-related issue from a multidisciplinary perspeotive.
Only by situating the case within its legal. political.
social, and eoonomic setting, may the full signifioanoe of
the final

5.82~

oountervailing duty on fresh whole Canadian

grotindfish be realized.
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The purpose of the thesis is to provide the reader with
an understanding of the international legal/political
frame~o~k

which encompasses countervailing duties and

subsidization. Then, it will explain the circumstances which
were present in the affirmative decision against Canadian
groundfish, and analyze the effect of the duty in terms of
its impact on U.S. - Canadian seafood trade relations, and
its impact on seafood imports in general.
Each of the six chapters will conclude by responding to
the statement presented in the opening paragraph of that
particular Chapter, as they were stated above. The conclusion of this thesis will reexamine these closing remarks
in light of the outcome of the groundfish CVD case. It will
then be possible to determine what was accomplished, or
learned, from the case, and what future implications it may
have.
The hypothesis is that very few positive benefits
resulted to any group by imposing a

5.82~

countervailing

duty on Whole, Canadian groundfish. From a social/political
perspective, the investigation, instead, serves to illustrate that the competitive position of U.S. fishermen has
seriously eroded in recent years, and that progressive
measures need to be taken by the U.S. fishing industry and
by the U.S. government to prevent further deterioration.
Chief among these measures are teohnological improvements,
an improved fisheries management regime, and a cooperative
fisheries trade/management relationship with Canada.
Similarly, froB a legal and economic perspective, the
investigation strengthened the interpretation of a
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countervailahle "subsidy" and "material injury," yet left
several other important questions about countervailing
dut1ea unresolved.
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Chapter I

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF lfATIONAL tI IlfTERHATIOlfAL
COUllTBRVAILIlfG DUTY LAY

Chapter I will examine how the countervailing duty
proceeding against Canadian groundfish relates to, or
complies with, the evolution of U.S. and international
countervailing duty rules. The terms "tariff" and "duty"
will often be interchanged throughout this chapter.
Although minor semantic differences do exist between the
terms, they are unimportant for the purpose of this discussion ..Basically, they both refer to a ta.:z: imposed by law
on the importation of certain goods.
Duties and tariffs have historically served four major
purposes in the United States. Prior to the passage of the
Income Ta.:z: Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (16th Amendment) in 1913, tariffs were used primarily as a source of
revenue for the federal government. They have also been
imposed for defense purposes, based upon a reluctance of
being dependent on foreign supplies of strategic war
materials. The "infant industry" argument is also frequently
referred to when justifying a tariff. New industries, it is
claimed, need protection from foreign imports until they
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have established themselves in the market. Finally, tariffs
are implemented to protect well-established domestic
industries from lower-priced foreign competition. This final
argument, in a manner of speaking, was the objective of the
countervailing duty petition against Canadian groundfish
imports .1.
Regardless of how valid these reasons may be, there are
equally strong, perhaps even stronger, arguments opposed to
the imposition of tariffs. These are based upon the contentions, widely attributed to Adam Smith and his book Ihe
Wealth of Nations, that tariffs create artificial distortions in the market which result in economic inefficiency
because resources are allocated to uses other than those
which would exist under perfect competition. Moreover, while
a tariff may enable domestic workers to obtain higher wages,
it may also require consumers to pay higher prices. Finally,
tariffs may ultimately trigger retaliation, thereby
resulting in a trade war. 2
This thesis will not attempt to weigh the merits of
these arguments. They are mentioned in order to provide a
setting against which a history of the relevant trade
legislation will be presented. The arguments themselves are
eternal, and can be expected to underlie practically every
chapter as it unfolds.
A countervailing duty is a special type of tariff which
is imposed by an importini nation fQr the purpQse Qf offsettini. or cQunterva11ini. the eCQnQm1c d1stQrt1Qns caused

AY

a suDs1dy 1n the e%pQrt1ni nat1Qn. Similar to a prQtec-

tive tariff, a subsidy artificially distorts competitive
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trading patterns. The countervailing duty is supposed to
restore a "level playing field" to international trade. It
is rea-sonably accurate to assume that most "free-market"
economies, certainly the signatories to the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), frown upon the
imposition of simple protective tariffs. However, countervailing duties are permitted because of their aforementioned
compensatory characteristics.
Countervailing duties and protective tariffs are
similar, yet very different in many respects. Subsidies are
actually more similar to tariffs than are CVO's, because of
their distorting effects. The remedy for a tariff would be
to eliminate or reduce it. The remedy for a subsidy is
either to remove it, or to impose a countervailing duty
against it. While protective tariffs have been applied
throughout modern history, countervailing duties, for all
practical purposes, have only become important in the last
ten or fifteen years. Nevertheless, it is useful to review
the evolution of countervailing duty law by referring to the
evolution of the more general tariff legislation because
changes in one often prompt, or coincide, with changes in
the other. Table 1 presents a chronological synopsis of
these changes as they will be presented in the forthcoming
discussion . .
The current United States interpretation of countervailing duties is based upon four souroes. These are: (1)
the 1979 U.S. Trade Agreements Act, (which amended the
Tariff Act of 1930); (2) the 1984 U.S. ITA "Subsidies
Appendix"; (3) the 1984 U.S. Trade and Tariff Act; and (4) a

-8TABLE 1
Evolution of u.s. & International CVD Legislation

1897-

First u.s. Countervailing Duty Law

1930-

u.s. Tariff Act of 1930

1947-

GATT Adopted ... Article VI entitled "Countervailing
and Antidumping Duties", and Article XVI entitled
"Subsidies in General" are applicable.

1955-

Section B entitled "Additional Provisions on Export
Subsidies" is added to GATT Article XVI.

1960-

GATT Working Party adds "Illustrative List of Prohibited
Export Subsidies" to Article XVI. This forms the basis
for Annex A (see Appendix A) .

1974-

u.S. adopts Trade Act of 1974. The United States accepts
"material injury" test only on non-dutiable imports.

1979-

GATT implements "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties" (GATT Subsidies Code). Also, Annex A, entitled
"Illustrative List of Export Subsidies" is formally
adopted. The "Subsidies Code" forms the basis of most
current international CVD legislation.

1979-

u.S. implements 1979 Trade Agreements Act to fulfill
it's GATT responsibilities. The injury test is accepted
on all imports. This law is the basis of the current U.S.
interpretation. Imports from non-signatories of GATT are
subject to Trade Act of 1974.

1984-

u.S. ITA publishes the "Subsidies Appendix" in which
they explain their procedures for calculating subsidies.

1984-

United States adopts the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
This law adds a section entitiled "Upstream Subsidies"
to the 1979 Trade Agreements Act and revises several
procedural aspects of the law.

1984Present Continuing interpretation of CVD law through individual
cases.
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continuing interpretation based upon official decisions by
the International Trade Administration, International Trade
Commission, and the U.S. Court of International Trade. These
four sources in turn, are rooted in the various international agreements which have been negotiated under the auspices
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. It should
become evident that the international CVD guidelines
established by GATT are relatively vague and, therefore,
subject to contrary interpretations. Similarly, decisions
handed down under the U.S. countervailing duty legislation
have also frequently yielded unexpected results.

1897 U.S. Countervailini Duty Law

The United States has had a countervailing duty law
since 1897, requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to
impose a countervailing duty whenever he found that a
dutiable import had been subsidized by a foreign
government. 3 Notice that a CVD was only allowed, to be
imposed on an item which was already subject to a U.S. duty.
Evidence of a "bounty or grant" paid on the "manufacture,
production or sale" of goods already subject to a tariff was
sufficient for the imposition of countervailing duties,
without any demonstration of injury to U.S. producers. 4
This distinction was made primarily because it was believed
that non-dutiable imports did not effectively compete with
U.S. producers. At that time, dutiable imports consisted
mostly of manufactured goods (non-primary products) and
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luxury items. Primary products enjoyed duty-free status.
generally speaking.

U.S. Tariff Act of 1930

Tariff levels in the United States had risen
dramatically before the Civil War. They continued to climb
after the Civil War until passage of the Underwood Act of
1913. during Woodrow Wilson's presidency. After World War I,

farmers and industrialists who were now both faced with
increased foreign competition for the first time. joined
together in backing the restoration of a protective system of
tariffs under the Tariff Act of 1930. or Smoot-Hawley as it
is commonly known as. This Act raised duties to an all time
high. triggered international retaliation and, thereby.
worsened the Great Depression. 5 Prior to this Act. countervailing duties had only been imposed 12 times during the
previous thirty-three years. 6
Smoot-Hawley is relevant to this stUdy for three
reasons. It established tariffs on several types and species
of seafood products. revised the countervailing duty law of
1897 (sec. 303), and directed the U.S. Tariff Commission to

conduct fact-finding investigations in order to determine the
trade practices of foreign nations (sec. 332).
The distinction between the treatment of dutiable and
non-dutiable imports persisted with the passage of this Act.
Section 303 reads as follows:
Whenever any Country •... sha11 payor
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bestow, directly or indirectly, any
bounty or grant upon the manufacture or
production or export of any article or
merchandise manufactured or produced in
such country, ... and such artiCle or merchandise is dutiable under the provisions
of this Act, then upon the importation of
of any such article or merchandise into
the United States, ... there shall be
levied and paid, in all such cases, in
addition to the duties otherwise imposed
this Act, an additional duty equal to the
net amount of such bounty or grant.
Again, a countervailing duty was to be imposed on any
dutiable import which was being subsidized, regardless of
whether its importation caused injury to U.S. producers.
Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930 empowered the
Tariff Commission to investigate the conditions of
competition between foreign industries and those of the
United States. This included, among other things, the effects
of export bounties and preferential transportation rates, the
volume of imports compared with domestic production, and
tariff relations in general.
The countervailing duty law in 1930 consisted of only
one paragraph. It lacked specificity and was rarely used. In
fact, during the 44 year period before it was amended in
1974, countervailing duties were only imposed approximately
40 times in the u.s. 7

1947 GATT Charter

During the depression years of the 1930's, America's
philosophy regarding tariffs shifted towards the "free-trade"
approach to which the nation still espouses to adhere to, in
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principle. Secretary of State Cordell Hull summarized this
attitude in 1937 by stating:
I have never faltered, and I will never
falter, in my belief that enduring peace
and the welfare of nations are indissoluably connected with friendliness, fairness, equality, and the maximum practical
deiree of freedom in international trade. 8
So, beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934 and continuing through implementation of the GATT in
1947 to the present, the U.S. position has been that all
protective tariffs should be reduced through international
negotiations, and any other artificial barriers to trade
(including subsidies) should eventually be prohibited.
The international "free trade" concept, popularized in
the United States by Hull, soon manifested itself in a State
Department proposal for an institution which was to be called
the International Trade Organization (ITO). Between 1946 and
1948 this proposal was amended four times. The final version
was drawn up in Havana in March 1948, and became known as the
"Havana Charter." For various reasons, the United States
decided against ratifying it and, instead, chose to accept a
general agreement which had been drawn up in Geneva in 1947,
prior to the drafting of the Havana Charter. This later became the founding document for the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (GATT), which assumed the commercial policy role
originally assigned for the ITO. 9
GATT contains neither the institutional provisions nor
all of the substantive provisions of the Havana Charter. It
does however, contain most of the commercial policy provisions which were being supported by U.S. diplomats in the
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1940's. The General Agreement, it has been said, is the
product of U.S. planning and philosophy. In this respect, due
to the enormous economic strength of the Nation after World
War II, the United States has played a large role in the
history of GATT. 10
Briefly, GATT was established in 1947 for the purpose of
reducing trade barriers between countries and promoting
cooperative. negotiated solutions to trade problems. Today.
GATT covers

4/5's

of world trade, and is represented by

ninety member nations. It consists of the Agreement, an
organization in Geneva, and a continuing series of multilateral negotiations. As previously mentioned, the first
negotiations were held in Geneva in 1947. Subsequently, major
tariff conferences have been held in Annecy , France in 1949,
Torquay, England in 1951, again in Geneva in 1956, and twice
during the 1960's. The two conferences held in the 1960's
have come to be referred to respectively as the Dillon and
Kennedy rounds. 11 The most important round with respect to
non-tariff barriers (including subsidies) was the Tokyo
round, completed in 1979. An eighth round formally commenced
on September 15, 1986 in Punte Del Este, Uruguay for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement on trade in services,
counterfeiting, agricultural subsidies, and other current
trade problems. 12
GATT was founded upon four principles, which remain at
the heart of the Agreement. These prinoiples are: (1) mutual
non-discrimination, (2) reciprocity, (3) fair trade, and (4)
surveillance. 13
Every signatory must grant every other signatory

-14-

"immediate and unconditional" most favored nation treatment .
This means that each trading partner will receive all of the
trading privileges which are given to any other country without discrimination . Since 1979, however , trade preferences
have been allowed to be given to developing nations.
The principle of reciprocity reinforces that of nondiscrimination. Essentially , trade concessions are to be
granted on reciprocal terms . Those signatories which grant
concessions must also reoeive them. Developing nations are
relieved of this obligation though, when negotiating with
developed nations.
The fair trade principle discourages a wide range of
practices which are commonly referred to as "non-tariff
barriers." Subsidies are included among these, as are technical, legal, and health regulations which otherwise impede
the international flow of merchandise. In recent years, a
major goal of the negotiations has been to reach consensus on
methods to reduce non-tariff barriers. They have proliferated
as the effects of tariff reductions have been realized.
Surveillance simply means that member nations are
obliged to publish all their trade measures . This principle
is reinforced by further obligations to notify and consult
with GATT if these trade measures might adversely affect
other signatories. 14
Articles VI and XVI of the original 1947 GATT charter
apply to countervailing duties and subsidies. Although they
have been expanded upon in recent years , these Articles are
still in effect.
Article VI, entitled "Antidumping and Countervailing
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Duties," allows a GATT signatory to impose a CVD on subsidized imports equal to the margin of the subsidy, once it
was determined that the effects of the subsidy were causing.
or threatening to cause, "material injury" to one of its
domestic industries. The subsidy must have been granted.
"directly , or indirectly, on the manufacture, production. or
export of such product in the country of origin or
exportation." This is as precise as the definition of a
subsidy was in the 1947 GATT charter.
The definition of "material injury" was likewise absent.
Moreover. because the United States did not originally
require a finding of material injury in its existing
legislation (Tariff Act of 1930) the nation was exempt from
this GATT requirement under the "grandfather clause" of the
Protocol of Provisional Application. This exemption would
later become a major irritant to the other GATT signatories . 15
Article XVI, entitled "Subsidies in General," requires
that each contracting party to GATT notify the others of any
subsidies it was granting which could be expected to affect
trade. If such subsidies were causing "serious prejudice" to
another party, the subsidizing government was, upon request ,
to consult with its trading partner with a view to limiting
the subsidization. This option was virtually ignored by both
countries in the recent groundfish investigation.
The most blatant discrepancy between Articles VI and
XVI of the original Agreement is the fact that Article VI
allows an importing nation to countervail

~

subsidy which

causes "material injury," whereas Article XVI only requires
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that a subsidizing country notify and consult with other
countries about the possibility of limiting the subsidization- Furthermore. the 1947 GATT failed to provide anything
more than a vague notion of the meaning of "material injury"
and "subsidy."
This is not surprising however. because subsidies were
considered a relatively minor issue in comparison with tariff
reductions and the other overall major objectives of the
General Agreement in 1947. Therefore. the two pertinent
Articles were ambiguous and even contradictory. This allowed
the United States with its strong bargaining power to conveniently sidestep the dilemma of supporting free trade

wh~le

maintaining an extensive farm price support system. The inevitable result was legislation which addressed few problems
and, in actuality. created more.

1955: Section B added to GATT Article XVI

In 1955. Section B entitled "Additional Provisions on
Export Subsidies" was added to Article XVI. This new section
treated those subsidies designed solely to promote exports
more severely than other types of domestic or production subsidies. Further. it differentiated between export subsidies
on primary products and export subsidies on non-primary products. An interpretive note later defined a primary product
as "any product of farm. forest. or fishery in its natural
form." Section B stated that contracting parties to GATT were
to "seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of pri-
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mary products." However, they could subsidize the export of
primary products, only if it did not result in providing
"morejhan an equitable share of world trade in that product"
to the exporting country. Export subsidization of non-primary
products was largely prohibited.
By allowing for the export subsidization of primary
products under these conditions, the GATT signatories, in
effect, accepted the massive subsidy programs which were, and
are, routinely granted to agricultural products worldwide.
However, the explanation of what constitutes an "equitable
share of world trade" was conspicuously absent from Section B
of Article XVI. Generally speaking, primary products, in
particular agricultural commodities, are not as highly
regulated under the GATT CVD provisions. Although forest and
fishery commodities have also been defined as primary
products. they seem to have lost the privilege which Section
B allows, as will be explained in the concluding chapter .
To repeat, even though export subsidies were supposed to
be treated more harshly than production subsidies under
Section B, export subsidies were allowed on primary products
if they did not result in providing more than an "equitable
share of world trade" in that product to the exporting
country. This distinction between export subsidies and
production subsidies is practically meaningless however,
because Article VI allows for the imposition of a CVD on any
product which has benefitted from a subsidy granted "directly
or indirectly on the manufacture. production, or export of
such product" (emphasis added). So, depending upon how this
is interpreted, a duty may have been allowed to offset the
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distorting effeots of both produotion and export subsidies.
The many loopholes in the 1947 and 1955 GATT provisions
are apparent. There simply was no olear, enforoeable set of
regulations governing the imposition of oountervailing
duties. Plaoing an emphasis upon export subsidies did not
olarify the issue. The problem stems from the absenoe of a
definition for "subsidy." The seemingly simple task of
assigning a legal definition to this word is made diffioult
by the vast array of programs whioh are granted to industry
by most governments. Ultimately, this leads to the philosophioal question: What role should the government be
allowed to play in the eoonomy? A moments refleotion will
indioate that there is no easy answer to this question whioh
will be satisfaotory to every nation . Similarly, there was,
and is, no oonolusive definition of a "subsidy."

1960 GATT

Workin~

Party List

It is usually agreed that government-sponsored programs
designed speoifioally to inorease export sales oreate distortions in international trading patterns. These programs,
oontingent upon export, were believed to be more harmful than
produotion subsidies. Beoause Seotion B of Artiole XVI had
not been very speoifio, a 1960 GATT Working Party drew up a
list of prohibited export subsidies, notwithstanding the
exemption granted to primary produots. Unfortunately, the
Working Party List was designated as only "illustrative,"
rather than "exhaustive." Thus, the exaot interpretation of
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even clearly prohibited export subsidies was still
debatable. 16 Nevertheless, this list did codify a few
activj,.:tites which could be considered "export subsidies" with
reasonable assurance.

U.S. Trade Act of 1974

No countervailing duties were imposed by the United
States between 1960 and 1967. Then suddenly, 17 CVD's were
imposed between 1967 and 1974. This rapid increase in the
early seventies may be attributed to a sharp increase in
imports during the period, and perhaps to an increased
reliance upon subsidies by exporting nations. 17
Generalizations have been made with respect to the types
of subsidies which were countervailed during the early 1970's
under the 1930 U.S. law, and the GATT. 18 Examples include
typical export subsidies as outlined by GATT, such as indemnification for loss when exporting, rebates of direct and indirect export taxes, and preferential transportation rates or
credit terms for export. However, in a landmark case against
Michelin tires imported from Nova Scotia in 1973, Canadian
federal and provincial assistance for the construction of a
tire plant were held countervailable because the funding was
only available in certain regions of Canada, and because
about

80~

of the plant's output was purchased in the United

States. 19 These decisions aided in the interpretation of
what was deemed a subsidy. That definition was slowly becoming less restrictive.
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Thus. the stage was set in 1974 for a major revision of
the U.S. countervailing duty law. Two problems had arisen
which~eeded

to be addressed . The first was that many petit-

ions prior to 1974 had simply been postponed by the Department of Treasury. This prompted a one year limit from the
date that a petition was filed to the date that a decision by
Treasury was to be reached. Second. several classes of
merchandise had recently been accorded duty free treatment as
a result of the GATT thereby making them ineligible for
countervailing duties under any circumstances. The U.S.
Trade Act of 1974 was designed to eliminate these
shortcomings. 20
Because so much merchandise was being imported into the
United States free of duties. Congress extended the provision
of countervailing duties to these items. However. before
CVD's could be imposed on these non-dutiable items: (1)
Treasury had to first find that they had been subsidized. and
(2) the International Trade Commission (ITC). which replaced
the Tariff Commission in 1974. had to find that an industry
in the U.S . was being. or was likely to be. injured by reason
of the importation of this non-dutiable subsidized merchandise. 21 The injury requirement on non-dutiable goods in the
Trade Act of 1974 thereby represented a major step in bringing the U.S . legislation in line with GATT. Dutiable items.
however. were still exempt from the "injury test." Also.
"material injury" under the Trade Act of 1974 still remained
open to interpretation and precedent. rather than to any
strict definition.
The Secretary of Treasury was allowed to waive the
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imposition of a CVD if he found that adequate steps had been
taken to remove the subsidy, or if the U.S. was currently
engaged in trade agreement negotiations (19 USC sec. 1303
(d)).

On the other hand, the law allowed Congress on a majority vote of either House to override Treasury's decision to
waive the imposition of a countervailing duty, if the duty
had already been justified prior to the waiver (19 USC sec.
1303 (e)).
In summary, both dutiable and non-dutiable imports which
had been found by the Department of Treasury to be subsidized
were eligible for a countervailing duty, under the Trade Act
of 1974. However, only non-dutiable imports were subject to
the "injury test." There was, unfortunately, still no definition of material injury . The amount of the CVD was to be
equal to the amount of the "bounty or grant" bestowed upon
the imported merchandise. A CVD could be waived by the Secretary of Treasury, unless Congress ruled otherwise, if trade
negotiations were in progress or if action was being taken to
remove the subsidy. Finally, a one year limit was placed upon
the length of the investigation.

1979 GATT Aireement on Subsidies and Counteryailini Duties

At the international level, there was much dissatisfaction with the existing GATT CVD rules. During the 50's and
60's when many of the industrialized nations were experiencing growth in their economies the issue of subsidization was
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rarely discussed in trade negotiations.

Nevertheless,

changes within the global economic and political system
necessitated a refinement of the rules governing international trade. As the system of colonialism came to an end,
many new sovereign nations came into existence. Very soon
thereafter, the call for a New International Economic Order
(NIEO) was first heard. These new nations felt that the
United States, as the predominant industrial power, had
established the international trade rules under a different
set of conditions than what prevailed in the 1970's, and that
ultimately this would reinforce U.S.

superiority. 22

The perception in the United States was that the
distinction between the public and private sector had become
blurred as a result of the increasingly massive amounts of
assistance which governments had been giving to their industries. Subsidization was believed to be a form of "covert
protection," designed to nUllify the benefits of the tariff
reductions which had been obtained through GATT. 23
Without question, the industrial/political structural of
the world economy had changed remarkably since 1947. Many
export industries, including energy, steel, mining, shipbuilding and aviation had been "nationalized" by foreign
governments which chose to resist market forces in order to
achieve broad social or defense objectives. The rise of giant
corporations, with strong business and labor interests. led
to new demands for government participation. 24 Subsidization became less overt, often hidden behind a myriad of other
programs. Indeed, free enterprise could no longer describe
the organization of competition which existed in these quasi-
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private sectors. 25

In the United States, the average tariff rate of all
dutiable imports had fallen from a high of

59.1~

in 1932 to

26.4~ in 1946 (and eventually to 4~ in 1985).26 Similar

reductions had taken place worldwide, largely because of
GATT. The reduction of tariffs coincided with an increase in
the use of non-tariff barriers to trade, including subsidies.
The subsidies though, were not the usual export contingent
types, for which the rules had largely been established.
Instead, they included regional development incentives, tax
exemptions, research and development grants, and a wide range
of loans. loan guarantees, and direct grants. Articles VI and
XVI of the 1947 General Agreement were generally considered
insufficient to regulate these kinds of activities.
The Michelin decision in 1973 generated a great deal of
concern among U.S. trading partners. What had originally
appeared to be a domestic policy decision to improve Canada's
regional and industrial structure had now become an infringement on U.S. trade laws. 27
In 1975 alone, the U.S. Treasury prooessed a record 38
cases. However, many of the duties were simply waived with
little reason being given. thereby adding further uncertainty
to the situation. 28 Very soon thereafter. the United States
and most of the other GATT signatories reoognized that meaningful international criteria needed to be developed in order
to clarify what would oonstitute fair oompetition and acceptable government industrial intervention. The Tokyo Round of
Hultilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) commenoed in 1975 with
the formidable task of trying to reach agreement on the use
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of non-tariff barriers, including subsidies.
U.S. negotiators came prepared to accept an "injury
test"-Dn All imports in exchange for a tighter definition of
prohibited export subsidies, and the right to impose CVD's on
injurious imports which receive domestic subsidization. The
European Community (EC) and the developing nations, among
other things, wanted a more precise law less subject to
interpretation. 29
The document which resulted from these meetings was the
1979 GATT Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII (GATT Subsidies Code). It is an
exceedingly complex document. Distinctions are made betweeu
developed and developing nations, domestic and export
subsidies, primary and non-primary products, and between
home-market and third-market competition. For the sake of
brevity, only issues relevant to the groundfish investigation
will be discussed.
In the simplest of terms, it was agreed that any subsidy
(domestic or export) is countervailable if, upon importation.
the subsidized products cause "material injury" to the domestic industry producing a like or similar product. The amount
of the countervailing duty may not exceed the amount of the
estimated subsidy, per unit of exported product.
Once again. however, a definition of material injury is
lacking. Instead the GATT Subsidies Code states that a
determination of material injury "shall involve an objective
examination of both, (a) the volume of subsidized imports and
their effect on prices in the domestio market for like
products and, (b) the consequent impaot of these imports on

-25-

domestic producers of such products" (Article 6, Paragraph
1).

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 list several factors to

be considered when investigating the volume and impact of
imports in order to decide whether or not a domestic industry
has experienced material injury.
been incorporated into the U.S .

These factors have since
legislation (Sec. 771

(7)(C)) and will be presented in detail later. The importance
of this list of factors for determing material injury
however, does not necessarily lie in what is actually
mentioned. Rather, it is that which is not mentioned which
may be more important.

Both lists (of factors to be

considered when assessing: (1) the volume, and (2) the
impact, of imports) conclude by stating that they are neither
exhaustive, nor able to provide gUidance in every case. 30
At the very least, there was now a consensus within GATT that
the effects of a subsidy must cause material injury before a
CVD could be imposed .
Another issue which was resolved during the 1975 - 1979
Tokyo Round was the codification and further refinement of
the list of prohibited export subsidies. The 1960 Working
Party List had never been officially accepted by GATT signatories. However, over the years it had acquired an aura of
authority and formed the basis of Annex A ("Illustrative List
of Export Subsidies," see Appendix A).31 As its title
suggests, the list is illustrative, and yet fairly easily
interpreted. The practice of allowing export subsidies on
primary products under certain conditions continued with
approval of the 1979 GATT Subsidies Code.
The GATT agreement on export subsidies, however, is not
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particularly important to a study of fish exports because
Canadian market intervention rarely involves direct
government assistance for the export promotion of fishery
products. 32
The 1979 GATT Subsidies Code advanced the notion of what
constituted a domestic subsidy, and under what circumstances
it could be countervailed. Article 11 recognizes the existence of domestic subsidies for the purpose of realizing
social or economic objectives. However, it specifies that
subsidies should be avoided whenever they "adversely affect
the conditions of normal competition," or cause material
injury. Article 11.3 is noteworthy in that it refers to suhsidies granted "with the aim of giving an advantage only to
certain enterprises." This is the first reference to this
very important concept. The legislation expands upon this
"specificity" concept by explaining that these subsidies are
usually granted either

re~ionally

or sectorally and include:

the provision of grants, loans or guarantees; government
provision of support services or facilities; government
funding of research and development; and government provision
of equity capital. These practices were not actually prohibited. They only exemplified potentially countervailable
activities.
The Agreement which resulted from the Tokyo negotiations
clearly reflected the various interests of its signatories.
The U.S. finally accepted an "injury test" on all imports in
exchange for the ability to impose CVDs on products which
benefited from domestic subsidization and also caused material injury, as the term is described in the Agreement. The
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definition of a prohibited export subsidy was strengthened
considerably with the addition of Annex A. and the concept of
discouraging programs which provide an advantage to specific
enterprises was introduced.

By and large. it is a "workable" document in the sense
that it describes most of the procedures to be followed when
imposing CVDs. Nevertheless. the 1979 GATT Code is not a
unified or comprehensive agreement on the treatment of CVDs
and subsidies. There is usually disagreement with the manner
in which the terms "material injury" and "subsidy" are
interpreted. Nations which possess an export-oriented economy
complain that these ambiguities offer.nations with large
markets disproportionate power to protect themselves from
normal market forces . On the other hand. importing nations
feel that the law should remain rather vague to meet any
unanticipated situations which might later arise.

1979 U.S. Trade

A~reements

Act

The 1979 GATT Subsidies Code has no independent standing
in U.S. courts. Therefore. Congress had to approve the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA-79) in order to put the 1979 GATT
provisions into effect. 33 This Act amended the Tariff Act
of 1930 by adding at the end thereof the following new title.
"Title VII--Countervailing

f!J

Antidumping Duties." These two

types of trade remedies are. therefore. frequently referred
to as "Title VII relief." Except for a few differences which
will be discussed later, the countervailing duty legislation
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in the U.S . Trade Agreements Act is consistent with Articles
VI and XVI of the GATT Subsidies Code. However. because the
U.S . Trade Agreements Act is an enabling document, it is by
necessity more precise than the international agreement from
which it was derived. Host of the concepts which were first
introduced in the 1947 and 1979 GATT Agreements are further
elaborated upon here. Like GATT. TAA-79 requires the existence of both subsidization and material injury before a CVD
may be imposed. The U.S. law. however. does not distinguish
between primary and non-primary products.
The U.S . Trade Agreements Act of 1979 applies only to
the thirty nations which have accepted the GATT Subsidies
Code. 34 Countervailing duty proceedings against products
from non-signatories are conducted under the auspices of the
U.S. Trade Act of 1974. Because Canada is a country under the
Agreement. the 1979 law. requiring a finding of material
injury. is applicable . The 1979 Trade Agreements Act together
with the 1984 International Trade Administration "Subsidies
Appendix." and the 1984 Trade

~

Tariff Act form the basis of

the current U.S. countervailing duty law.
In 1980. the International Trade Administration (ITA) of
the Department of Commerce replaced the Department of
Treasury as the administering authority in countervailing
duty investigations. For eaoh investigation. the ITA is now
responsible for determining the existence and magnitude of
subsidization. and the ITC has been assigned the responsibility of determining whether or not a domestic industry has
experienced material injury. by reason of the subsidized
imports.
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These two organizations reach their determinations
separately. Both of them must make an affirmative decision
before the final countervailing duty becomes effective.
Congress established a procedure whereby the ITC and the ITA
each reach two separate decisions-- one preliminary and the
other final. The four determinations (preliminary and
final ... "material injury" and "subsidy") are handed down
according to a strict timetable. Under normal circumstances
an investigation will take no longer than 205 days.
Extensions, however, are granted if an investigation is
complicated or, if it involves "upstream subsidies." Appendix
B illustrates how this legal process was actually employed in
the Canadian groundfish case.
The Act specified that the ITA and the ITC use the "best
available information" in order to reach their decision. This
evidence is to be collected from questionnaires which are
distributed to foreign exporters and domestic producers. The
information is then verified through official visits by the
appropriate representatives from each agency.
Several terms which became important in the Canadian
groundfish investigation were defined in the 1979 U.S. Trade
Agreements Act, including "material injury," "industry," and
"like product." Additionally, the concept of "subsidy" was
advanced by reemphasizing those programs which were granted
for the purpose of prOViding a competitive advantage to
specific industries, as opposed to being "generally available" to all industries.
The relevant statutes read as follows:

Sec. 701
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(a) General Rule.-If(1) the (ITA) determines that(A) a country under the Agreement (GATT) ...
is providing, directly or indirectly, a subsidy with
respect to the manufacture, production, or exportation of
a class or kind of merchandise imported into the United
States, and
(2) the (ITe) determines that(A) an industry in the United States(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury ...
by reason of imports of that merchandise,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a
countervailing duty, ... equal to the amount of the net
subsidy.
Sec. 702
(b) Initiation by Petition.(1) Petition Requirements.- A countervailing duty
proceeding shall be commenced whenever an interested party
. .. files a petition with the (ITA), on behalf of an
industry, which alleges the elements necessary for the
imposition of the duty ... , and which is accompanied by
information reasonably available to the petitioner
supporting those allegations.
Sec. 771
For purposes of this title(4) Industry.(A) In General.- The term "industry" means the
domestic producers as a whole of a like product, or
those producers whose collective output of the like
product constitutes a major proportion of the total
domestic production of that product.
(D) Product Lines.- The effect of subsidized .. .
imports shall be assessed in relation to the United
States production of a like product ... in terms of such
criteria as the production process or the producers
profits. If ... no seperate identity in terms of such
criteria (exist), then the effect of the subsidized ...
imports shall be assessed by the examination of the
production of the narrowest group or range of products
which includes a like product, for which the necessary
information can be provided.
(10) Like Product.- The term "like product" means a
product which is like, or in the absence of like, most
similar in characteristics and uses with, the article
subject to an investigation under this title.
(5) Subsidy.- The term "subsidy" ... includes, but is not
limited to, the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the
(GATT) Agreement. (Appendix 1 of this thesis)
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided
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or required by government action to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries, ... and whether paid ... directly or
indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export
of any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan
guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial
considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at
preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt
to cover operating losses sustained by a specific
industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of
manufacture, prOduction, or distribution .
(7) Material Injury.(A) In General.- The term "material injury" means
harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or
unimportant.
(B) Volume and Consequent Impact.- In making its
determinations ... the (ITC) shall consider, among other
factors(i) the volume of imports of the merchandise
which is the subject of the investigation,
(ii) the effect of imports of that merchandise
on prices in the United States for like prOducts,
and
(iii) the impact of imports of such merchandise
on domestic producers of like products.
(C) Evaluation of Volume and of Price Effects .For the purposes of subparagraph (B)(i) Volume.- In evaluating the volume of
imports of merchandise, the (ITC) shall consider
whether the volume of imports of the merchandise,
or any increase in that volume, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or
consumption in the United States, is significant.
(ii) Price.- In evaluating the effect of
imports of such merchandise on prices, the (ITC)
shall consider whether(I) there has been significant price
undercutting by the imported merchandise as
compared with the price of like products of
the United States, and
(II) the effects of imports of such
merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a
significant degree or prevents price increases
which otherwise would have occurred, to a
signifioant degree.
(iii) Impact on Affected Industry.- In examining
the impact on the affected industry, the (ITC)
shall evaluate all relevant eoonomic factors
which have a bearing on the state of the
industry, including, but not limited to(I) actual and potential decline in
output, sales, market share, profits,
productivity, return on investments, and
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utilization of capacity,
(II) factors affecting domestic prices, and
(III) actual and potential negative effects
on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, ability to raise capital, and
investment.
(11) Affirmative Determinations by Divided Commission.If the Commissioners voting on a determination by the
(ITC) are evenly divided as to whether the determination
should be affirmative or negative, the (ITC) shall be
deemed to have made an affirmative determination.

The 1979 Act represented a great advancement in the
interpretation and implementation of countervailing duties in
the United States. Most notably, it transformed the relatively vague U.S. legislation of 1974 and 1930 into a more
legalistic process by eliminating much of the uncertainty
surrounding CVD investigations. Under the Trade Act of 1974,
Treasury was allowed to waive a countervailing duty because
of political considerations, but was not to be influenced by
politics when determining the amount or presence of a
subsidy. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 specified that a
CVD be imposed whenever a subsidy was found and material
injury was proven, with no regard to politics whatsoever. The
meaning of both "subsidy" and "material injury" were advanced
somewhat, and other important terms were more clearly
defined. 35

1984 U.S, ITA "Subsidies Appendix"

Neither the 1979 GATT Subsidies Code nor the 1979 U.S .
Act provided a methodology for calculating the gross subsidy
(that amount which was provided and used, discounting for
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allowable offsets). The legislative history in the United
States reveals nothing more concrete than a directive that
the ITA use "reasonable methods" in calculating the value of
the subsidy. Furthermore, the GATT signatories have been
unable to agree upon any rules governing the calculation of
subsidies as recommended under Article 4, paragraph 2.
footnote 2 of the 1979 Code ("an understanding among
signatories should be developed setting out the criteria for
the calculation of the amount of the subsidy"). So on April
26 of 1984, following an investigation against imports of
steel from Argentina. the ITA published a "Subsidies
Appendix" (49 FR 18016, 18023) which provided a detailed
explanation of the methodology used to examine grants, loans.
loan guarantees. and equity infusions.
The following excerpt describes the manner in which the
ITA allocates the benefits of certain types of subsidies over
time:
The subsidy calculation is a three step process .
First. the cash flow differential between the
countervailable government loan. equity investment. or grant and the appropriate market alternative is calculated. Then. an appropriate discount rate is chosen. Finally. the stream of
benefits of the net subsidy is allocated over a
reasonable period and in a reasonable fashion .. .
To oalculate the subsidized amount of a loan. the
cash in (receipts) and oash out (repayments) under
a government program are matohed with the cash in
and cash out of a comparable commercial loan. Any
positive cash differential obtained under the
government program is a subsidy. For equity
investments. it is the exoess that the government
paid over what the market would pay for that
equity. For g~gnts. the subsidy is the faoe value
of the grant.
Funds provided by the government oonstitute a subsidy to
the extent that the recipient pays less for them than the

-34-

recipient would have to pay on the market. The effect of the
benefit is then diffused over the time that this cash flow
differential occurs. Therefore, the ITA must determine the
appropriate period over which to allocate the benefit, and
decide how much of the benefit to allocate to each sub-period
(usually a year). In no instance may the amount of the duty
exceed the amount of the subsidy . Appendix C expands upon the
relevant procedures for accomplishing this. The actual ITA
"Subsidies Appendix" from which Appendix C is derived , is
considerably more detailed.
Essentially, the ITA uses a "present value" analysis to
account for the changing value of money over time. It

dete~

mines the value of the benefit by taking the aforementioned
cash flow differential between the government program and a
comparable commercial program (PV). Next, the ITA allocates
this over the average useful life of renewable physical
assets for the industry (N). For example, fishing vessels
have an average useful life of 18 years. Then an appropriate
discount rate is chosen which reflects the industry's time
preference for money, as determined by its expected rate of
return on investment and operations at the time the money is
received. This is referred to as the industry's "opportunity
cost of capital" (K).37 The following example illustrates
the application of this technique. 38
Grant Value (PV)

$1000

Avg. Life of Assets

(N)

10 yrs.

Discount Rate

(K)

.05

Annual Subsidy

(x)

?

-

- -

-

-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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PV

*

x(l+K) - (l+K)l-N/ K

S1000 - x(1+.05) - (1+.05)-9/. 05
x - S123.34

Finally, the annual subsidy is divided by the annual
value of production or exportation of the merchandise subject
to the investigation to arrive at the particular

~

valorem

subsidy for the program in question . In the groundfish case,
the ITA utilized the f.o.b. value of production in Atlantic
Canada of all fish and shellfish. To continue with the
example, imagine that the f.o.b. value of production in
Canada of all fish and shellfish is S10,OOO. Then the ad
valorem subsidy would be:

S123.34/S10,OOO
=.01%

The ITA's procedures for calculating the value of a
subsidy conferred by (1) a loan, and (2) an equity investment, are inconsistent with the views of Canada and the
European Community.39 Appendix D explains these differences
in greater detail.

1984 U.S, Trade and Tariff Act

The U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 amended the 1979
Trade Agreements Act in a few respects. First, it specified
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the various "public interest factors" which need to be taken
into account when accepting an agreement to suspend a
countervailing duty investigation. It also clarified the term
"threat of material injury." Further, the interpretation of a
countervailable subsidy was broadened with the addition of a
section entitled "upstream subsidies." Finally, the 1984 U.S.
Trade and Tariff Act refined some of the procedural aspects
of a CVO investigation.

PreVious Counterva11ini Duty Decisions

Previous countervailing duty cases have addressed issues
which were not adequately explained in either the U.S.
legislation or in the ITA "Subsidies Appendix." Because these
issues have a bearing on the groundfish investigation, they
will briefly be discussed.

Material Injury- In a case involving Carbon Steel Wire from
Brazil , Trinidad and Tobago (47 FR 47452 26 Oct. 1982), the
ITC determined that the amount of the subsidy was irrelevant
to a finding of material injury.40

Causation of Material Injury- During a 1984 investigation
against Steel Wire Rods, the ITC stated that subsidized
imports need not be the single greatest cause of injury to
the domestic industry, but only a contributing cause of
injUry.41
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Researoh and DevelQpment Grants- During a 1984 investigatiQn
against Israeli rQses, the ITA ruled that a subsidy dQes nQt
exist if research and develQpment OQsts paid by the gQvernment results in the infQrmatiQn being published in the Qpen
literature. It is now generally aooepted that basio researoh
grants dQ nQt oQnfer a subsidy, but development grants aimed
at bringing speoifio produots tQ market may be oQuntervailed. 42

Unemployment Insurance- During a 1984 investigation against
German steel, the ITA ruled that a subsidy did exist if the
gQvernment paid the oQmpanies share Qf unemplQyment insuraBoe
premiums. 43

CQunteryailin~

Duties and the Law TQday

FQr the mQst part, the U.S. oQuntervailing duty law is
oQnsistent with GATT. The United States has, at least,
accepted the "injury test." HQwever , SQme signifioant
differenoes still remain between the U.S. interpretatiQn and
thQse of the Qther signatQries Qn a few key issues.
The GATT Subsidies CQde at Artiole 6, paragraph 4 reads:
"It must be demQnstrated that the subsidsized impQrts are,
thrQu~h

the effeots Qf the SubsiQY, oausing injury within the

meaning Qf this Agreement," before a CVD may be impQsed.
Whereas, SeotiQn 701(a)(2) Qf the 1979 U.S. Trade Agreements
Aot speoifies that: "if the Commission determines that an
industry in the United States is materially injured .. . ~
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reaSQn Qf subsidized impQrts, then there shall be impQsed Qn
such merchandise a cQuntervailing duty ." FrQm an eCQnQmic
perspective this difference is critical. Under GATT, the
unfair act (subsidizatiQn) must cause the injury, while the
U.S . law Qnly requires that the impQrts themselves be the
cause Qf injury . It is pQSsible that this discrepancy might
sQmeday form the basis upQn which a decisiQn by the U.S ITO
is challenged under GATT .
There has alsQ been dissatisfactiQn with the manner in
which the U.S. InternatiQnal Trade AdministratiQn calculates
the value Qf certain types Qf subsidies, as discussed in
Appendix D. 44 FurthermQre, the reader will recall that the
meaning of the term "subsidy" is nQt explicitly defined in
either the U.S. statutes Qr in GATT. The meaning in the U.S.
is instead described by reference tQ tWQ nQn-exclusive lists
of representative subsidies. The possible range Qf countervailable export subsidies includes, but is not limited to ,
the subsidies listed in Annex A Qf GATT (see Appendix A). A
dQmestic subsidy, Qn the Qther hand, may be cQuntervailed if
it is targeted tQ a specific industry. Section 771 (5)(B) Qf
the 1979 U.S. Trade Agreements Act mentiQns the fQllQwing
types Qf programs as being pQtentially cQuntervailable
dQmestic subsidies:
(i) the provisiQn Qf capital, lQans, or lQan
guarantees Qn terms incQnsistent with
cQmmercial cQnsiderations.
(ii) the prQvisiQn of gQQds Qr services at
preferential rates.
(iii) the grant Qf funds Qr fQrgiveness Qf debt to
CQver Qperating lQsses sustained by a specifio
industry.
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(iv) the assumption of any costs or expenses of
manufacture . production or distribution .
So. significant differences still exist in the manner in
which nations interpret the countervailing duty laws . This
should not come as any great surprise . however . There will
probably never be a consensus as to what exactly constitutes
subsidization . As nations continue to resort to a bewildering
array of assistance programs. the question of subsidization
will continue to be answered on a case-by-case basis.
Non-tariff barriers to trade will present problems for
eternity. as it is impossible to condemn all forms of
intervention. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is some
degree of "repeatability" in the decisions .
Some of these issues may be resolved in the GATT talks
which opened in September 1986 . where it is expected that
non-tariff barriers will again be a top priority. For the
time being however. the United States provides the largest
body of law on the subject, and forms the basis for the
groundfish investigation.
To review, the U.S. interpretation is based upon three
major sources. These are: (1) the legislation in the 1979
Trade Agreements Act and 1984 Trade and Tariff Act (as
derived from 1979 GATT Subsidies Code), (2) the ITA
"Sub s i d i e s Appendix," and (3) the individual case decisions
handed down by the ITA and the ITC. As with any law, its
meaning and significance will evolve over time. Therefore ,
the Canadian groundfish CVD investigation will undoubtedly
enhance our understanding of the permissible extent of
government participation allowed in the economy. Practically

-40-

every unresolved issue which has already been discussed in
this evolution has also arisen during the investigation.
This brings the evolution of countervailing duties up to
date. Although the legislation has been in existence since
1897, most significant developments have occured only between
1974 and 1984. This has coincided with several changes in the
international community. First, tariff barriers have been
reduced to historioally low levels. Second. governments have
increasingly resorted to economic intervention for the
purpose of achieving broad social and defense objectives.
And. most importantly, the U.S. trade deficit has soared in
recent years. U.S. industries have responded to these events
by demanding for the imposition of countervailing duties to
offset the effects of the resultant increase in imports.
Tension has arise

between America and its trading partners,

thereby requiring international negotiations and increasingly
complex regulations .
While fisheries are not necessarily the most important
trade sector, the issues presented in the Canadian groundfish
case are illustrative of the problems which inevitably arise
in CVD investigations. Because the international community
has been unable to "come to grips" with these problems, the
manner in which the U.S. resolves them will have a lasting
effect on international trade relations. Even minor
differences in the interpretation of the countervailing duty
legislation can contribute to the success or failure of a
petition. These minor differences may then contribute to the
escalation of a significant trade dispute.

-41-

CHAPTER II

THE U. S. - CANADIAN SEAFOOD TRADB RELATIONSHIP

This Chapter will briefly review the current political
and trade relationship between the United States and Canada.
The purpose is to examine how the groundfish investigation
and the resulting countervailing duty might influence. or be
influenced by. a potential bilateral free trade agreement
between the two nations
In terms of geographic size. Canada is the world's
second largest nation. However. it possesses a population
only 1/10 as large as that of the United States. Except for
the metropolitan areas in the south-central region. most of
Canada remains sparsely populated. Income and industrial
activity are exceptionally low in these rural provinces.
Agricultural and extractive industries dominate their
economies. Fortunately. they are often blessed with at least
one valuable natural resource. depending upon the region.
Primary products such as grains. textiles. potatoes. berries.
dairy products. meat products. seafood products. wood M pUlp
products. metals M ores. and oil M natural gas are the economic mainstays in rural Canada. 45 Fishing is particularly
important to the economy of the rural Atlantic provinces.
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Manufacturing and service industries are located in the
metropolitan areas. The largest manufacturing sector in
Canada is the automobile and automotives industry. Other
manufacturing sectors transform the Nation's raw materials
into final products such as beer, lumber, paper, and
processed foods.
Because of Canada's small population, each of these
industries is partially dependent upon exports. The immense
size and proximity of the U.S. makes it a particularly
attractive market.

of Canadian exports were destined for
the United States in 1985. 46 Conversely, Canada is also the
75~

largest market for U.S. exports. At least

21~

of U.S. exports

are sent to the North, which constitutes 70~ of total Canadian imports. 47 In 1986, bilateral trade is expected to
exceed $150 billion. 48 Never before has a greater value of
trade been exchanged between two nations. 4 9
This trade relationship is just one aspect of a larger
political relationship between the United States and Canada
which has historically been characterized as harmonious.
These two nations are cultural cousins. They share, for the
most part, a common language, the longest undefended border
in the world, and oftentimes similar eoonomic , social, and
strategic interests. 50
In recent years however, a number of trade disputes have
arisen which may jeopardize this relationship. Since 1979, 13
countervailing duty petitions have been filed with the
Department of Commerce against a wide range of Canadian
products. Some of the products listed in these petitions
include shakes and shingles, subway cars, softwood products,
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automobile tires. swine S pork products, raspberries, cut
flowers, and seafood products. In addition, 30 antidumping
duty (ADD) petitions have been filed since that time (see
Appendix E for a complete list of "Title VII" cases against
Canada).51 Recently there have been indications that the
government of Canada may begin to retaliate against these
restrictions.
Seafood has long been a matter of contention between the
two nations. The effects of Canadian seafood imports have
been investigated by the U.S . federal government at least
eight times since 1950. However aside from the case which is
the subject of this thesis, only one other investigation

h~s

resulted in higher tariffs or additional duties . The
following section will highlight the most important findings
in these seafood investigations.

Previous U.S. Trade Cases

~-

Involvin~

Canadian Seafood

Under Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act

of 1951, the Tariff Commission recommended that President
Eisenhower impose increased duties on imported fresh and
frozen groundfish fillets, but the President declined. 52

~-

The Tariff Commission unanimously recommended the

maximum permissible increase in duties on fresh and frozen
groundfish fillets, under the provisions of Section 7 of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended. Again,
the President decided not to follow the Tarriff Commission

-44recommendation. 53

~-

As a result of another Tariff Commission investigation

under Section 225(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
groundfish fillets and steaks were excluded from negotiations
for tariff reductions in the Kennedy Round of GATT.

September 1978- In response to a petition filed on June 10.
1977 by the Fishermens Marketing Association Inc. of Seattle,
Washington, and supported by the Point Judith Fishermen's
Cooperative, the Department of the Treasury determined that
the right to impose a countervailing duty on Canadian
groundfish should be waived. Treasury ruled that the total
countervailabe duty was equal to 17.22% of the value of
groundfish products prior to April 1, 1978. After April 1,
some of the bounties were to be eliminated so that the CVD
would be 5.22%. With the elimination of direct payments to
Canadian fishermen under the Temporary Assistance Program
(TAP) on October 1, 1978, the duty would be only 1.22%.
The ITC ruled that there was no likelihood of injury
from such a low rate of subsidization because U.S. landings,
production, capacity, and prices had all risen recently. So.
although subsidies were found, no CVD was imposed. 54

April 1979- This petition was filed six months later by the
National Federation of Fishermen and the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative . It involved dutiable and non-dutiable
fish which had not been included in the previous investigation. Specifically, these were: (1) whole cusk, hake, and
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pollOck (fresh. chilled. and frozen); (2) frozen blocks of
ocean perch. haddock. and whiting; and (3) live lobsters and
scallops.
Treasury determined the net subsidy to be equal to 1.7%
of the value of groundfish. and 1.08% of the value of shellfish. They then announced that the CVD would be waived under
Section 303(d)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974. regardless of
what the ITC found with respect to material injury.
The ITC however. did not find a reasonable indication of
material injury. They cited the following reasons:
1) The ratio of Canadian imports to U.S.
consumption had dropped.
2) U.S. landings had risen.
3) Prices to domestic fishermen had risen.
4) There was little U.S. production of frozen
blocks.
5) There was a limited response to questionnaires
from the U.S. industry.
6) The recent imposition of the Magnuson Act would
eliminate foreign fishing and increase U.S.
production.
So again. while the ITA acknowledged Canadian subsidization. no relief was provided. 55

January 1980- On August 20. 1979. West Coast fishermen filed
a petition. supported by two East Coast fishermen's
associations . asking for an ITC investigation (under section
201 of the Trade Act of 1974) to determine if the importation
of fresh and frozen groundfish. whether whole or filleted.
was a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic
industry. On the basis of rather unsatisfactory data. the ITC
could not find that there had been serious injury . If there
was injury. a rapid expansion of the West Coast fleet and
conservation quotas on the Bast Coast were more substantial
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causes than imports from Canada. As in other investigations.
fishermen failed to submit financial data.

Only six
questionnaires were returned of 200 mailed out. 56

May 1980- In this case. the ITA determined that a net subsidy
equal to 1.08% was being provided to whole and filleted
groundfish. both fresh and frozen. The ITC. however. found
that while the U.S. industry was experiencing problems they
were not related to Canadian imports. Instead. conservation
quotas. foreign fishing, and an overcapitalized fleet were
the major disturbances. 57

December 1981- In response to a petition filed by the McCurdy
Fish Company of Lubec, Maine concerning hard smoked herring
fillets, the ITC made a negative preliminary determination of
material injury, because the company's profits had increased
over the relevant period. 58

~-

The only successful request for import relief, aside

from the 1986 groundfish decision, has been an antidumping
duty petition filed by the Saltfish Corporation of Ponce,
Puerto Rico. During its entire period of operation (19821984). the company was unable to sell sufficient quantities
of salt cod to break even. Saltfish Corporation was eventually forced to shut down. The ITA determined that Canada had
sold salt cod at "less than fair value" in the Puerto Rican
market. The ITC then made a final ruling on July 3, 1985 that
the establishment of a domestic industry was being materially
retarded because of the Canadian imports.

Therefore, the ITC

-47imposed antidumping duties differing with respect to the
margin of dumping. 59

U,S. - Canadian Free Trade Talks

Although offsetting duties against subsidization or
unfair trading practices are justified under both U,S. law
and GATT, they are somewhat inconsistent with our "good
neighbor" policy towards Canada, Not surprisingly, discussions of free trade have arisen frequently over the past
century, and are once again underway.
On September 26, 1985, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney
proposed to President Reagan that their respective governments consider a new trade agreement "involving the broadest
possible package of mutually beneficial reductions in
barriers to trade in goods and services,,,60 The Senate
Finance Committee later granted the President the authority
he needed to begin negotiations. After months of talks, free
trade negotiations formally began on May 26, 1986, The fundamental purpose of these negotiations is to eliminate all or
most of the tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between
the two countries.
Officials from both countries have refused to release
any information while the talks are going on, However, any
agreement will not be subject to alterations by Congress.
Under "fast track" rules Congress will only be able to either
accept or reject the agreement. 61 The free trade talks have
recently resumed in Ottawa on November 12. 1986. If suffi-
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cient progress is made. negotiators hope to present their
Governments with a completed deal by September. 1987. So far,
no formal statements have been released.

Impact of a Potential Trade
on New

En~land

A~reement

Fishermen

Canada is an important trading partner in fishery
products. It ranks first among the nations which the United
imports seafood from. On the other hand. Canada is second
only to Japan as a market for U.S. exports of fishery
products. 62 Because of the huge amount of bilateral trade
and unique political relationship between the two countries,
an examination of complete trade liberalization is certainly
warranted. Obviously. any trade negotiations will require
concessions on behalf of both nations . Therefore, it is
likely that the non-tariff issue of countervailing duties and
subsidization will arise. because simply eliminating established tariffs on fresh groundfish will not have a significant impact on trade flow. as the duties are already quite
low (the U.S. in 1987 requires that importers pay $.DD/lb.
for whole groundfish and $ .D1875/lb. for groundfish fillets
...... Canada imposes no import duties).
Most likely. the elimination of tariff barriers would
not benefit the New England industry to the extent that it
would other U.S. fisheries. In 1977.

67.6~

of total Canadian

fish exports went to the United States. On the other hand.
U.S. exports made up

54.6~

of total Canadian seafood imports.
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However species exported to Canada consisted primarily of
shrimp. salmon. crab. and warmwater finfish. Canada imports
relatively little fresh groundfish. The Section 332 report
stated that in 1982. the U.S. imported $16 million of fresh
whole groundfish from Canada. whereas Canada imported only
$1 .5 million from the U.S. The difference was even more
dramatic with fresh fillets.
Table 2 provides a list of the top ten U.S. seafood
exports to Canada. and the top ten seafood imports from
Canada. along with their tariff rates. 63 This table indicates that the increase in exports which which would occur by
reducing the various Canadian tariffs now in existence would
be enjoyed largely by the fishermen and processors of the
U.S. Pacific Northwest and Gulf Coast. Conversely. any
increase in Canadian imports due to U.S. tariff reductions
would largely be products which compete. directly or
indirectly. with the New England industry (frozen cod.
groundfish fillets. etc.).
In order to compensate for this imbalance. U.S.
negotiators must avoid a situation where the bargains agreed
upon result in regional prejudices. One solution is to
request the removal of Canadian non-tariff barriers like
subsidies. As the subsidies are phased out. the countervailing duty would have to be gradually removed. However.
until this occurs the U.S. will probably stand firm with the
CVD. On the other hand. if Canada is not willing to reduce
its subsidies. they might attempt to request for some sort of
exemption from the U.S. countervailing duty laws. in exchange
for Canadian conoessions. Regardless of what occurs. it is
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TABLE 2
Top Ten U.S. Impotts
from Can.~l (1985)
TanH
l.96~/lb.

1105550

Cod fi 11ets.

1144510

LCl:)st.ets. 11 ve. f:e.h

Free

1104710

Cod l:)loc:k.

F:ee

1144537

Sc:alle~s.

1107039

Ot.her flatfish fillets. f:oun

1105520

Atlan:~c:

1141500

Cra=~eat.

1144530

Lc~s:!tS.

1147070

Otne: millin;
mixed teeds

1112200

Cod. c:usk. haddoc~. hake,
polloc:k, salted or pic:kled

~:::::un

Free

f:esh or frozen

Cc:ean ~:c:h fille: ••
f::!sl'\ at' f:ozen

s~ec:ifie~

by-~rod~c::s

L 96f/ re,

7.5\ ad val.

ftesh or ftozen

not else~here
f:esl'\ Ot f:ozen

Free

Free

of
Fre.

Top Ten
U.S. Expores to Canada
1915

Pt'oduc:e

.!!!!a

Canadian
TuiU

110.620

Salmon. f:e.h or frozen

3.n ad val.

1142800

Shrilllp. frozen

free

1121940

Sal::lon, canned

l.n ad val.

1104640

Fish Other than .allllon.
fresn or f:ozen
.

1107540

Fish fillets. seea~., etc ••
fresh or frozen. except .a1mon

fte.

1142600

Kin;

n ad val.

1144900

Shrilllp. canned

fn.

1142150

Sh.llflsh. NS". fr.sh chilled

fr••

1142110

Lobst.r. fresh or c:hil1ed

fr••

1104610

Her~in9. ~hole

e~~b.

frozen

or evise.raeed,
f:ee
at f:,zen
.
source: Trade Problems and Opportunities in Fishery
Products Trade Between the United States and
Canada. by William J. Bellows and Jukka A. ~olhonen.
c:h111e~
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apparent that tariff reductions may not be the most important
goal of free-trade talks in the fisheries sector. because
most of the fishery trade between the two Nations occurs at
relatively low tariff rates.
Perhaps trade-offs can be negotiated providing for joint
access to straddling stocks. cooperative fisheries management. removal of the countervailing duty. reduction of
Canadian subsidies. and finally the removal of tariff
barriers. It is difficult to predict the outcome of such an
involved issue. Without doubt however. the countervailing
duty will playa key role in the discussions. It may very
well be the most important "bargaining chip" of the New
England industry. as it stands to "lose out" by just relaxing
tariff barriers.
The issue will be further complicated because of the
wide range of industrial sectors which are involved in the
trade negotiations with Canada. 64 Fishing interests must be
sure that their position is not bargained away at the hands
of these other sectors (autos. lumber. grains, etc.).
Assuming that negotiations progress further. the countervailing duty issue will playa key role with respect to both
fisheries trade and management. The possibility exists to
reach some long overdue agreements. The possibility of
worsening a bad situation also exists.
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Chapter III

OTHER SBAFOOD IMPORTS POTBlITIALLY SUBJECT
'1'0 U. S.

TRADB RESTRICTIONS

Because seafood is an international commodity, almost
every major sector of the U.S. fishing industry is affected
by imports. While complaints are frequently voiced about
these imports, they are rarely acted upon. Will this situation change with the resolution of the Canadian groundfish
case? What effect will it have on the likelihood of securing
trade restrictions on other imported seafood products?
In 1983, the U.S. trade deficit in edible fishery
products was a staggering $2.7 billion. 6S However, efforts
to obtain import relief have usually failed. There are a few
inherent reasons why these cases have been unsuccessful. For
an imported product to be subject to restrictions, it must
usually be "like ... or directly competitive" with that which
is produced by the domestic industry. This includes such
criteria as quality, size, and stage of processing .
Therefore, if the U.S. shrimp fleet supplies mostly fresh,
unpeeled, head-off, large shrimp to the local white tablecloth market, then peeled, medium, frozen shrimp sold to
institutional buyers may not qualify as a "like ... or direotly

.
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competitive product."
The market structure of the fishing industry also
frustrates attempts to impose restrictions on imports.
Processors who depend upon imported and domestic product do
not wish to see duties imposed on their raw material, whereas
the domestic fishermen do. The concentrated buying power of a
few large processors may wield enough influence to discourage
fishermen from voicing their complaints.
Finally, it may be difficult to prove that imports are
actually harmful to the U.S. industry. One may argue that
they are a necessary supplement to domestic supply. Demand
for seafood is increasing at the same time that stocks are
declining. Because American fishermen are currently able to
sell their entire catch at historically high prices, how can
imports be harmful? Instead, other factors such as an
antiquated market structure, overcapitalization, increased
operating costs (especially insurance), overfishing , and
ineffective management may be the real culprits. Given the
current trend of decreased domestic landings and increased
consumer demand, imports might be considered inevitable.
Therefore, predictions about vulnerability to trade
restrictions should be considered speculative at best. In
most situations, they can only be imposed to insure that the
products are traded "fairly."

Depending upon the circum-

stances, there are at least six different remedies available
to U.S. industries which are suffering from import competition. 66 Because each of these remedies is subject to a
rather narrow set of conditions which must first be satisfied
before relief is granted, the sucoess of a petition often
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hinges on the choice of a remedy. For instance, countervailing duties can only be imposed when subsidies are discovered
in the exporting country. Likewise, each of the other options
has its own particular requirements. Therefore, the task of
selecting an appropriate remedy is best left to a lawyer who
is familiar with the circumstances confronting an industry
during a particular point in time. The following section will
highlight those products which may be subject to future
relief and indicate the reasons Why . Similarities between the
Canadian groundfish case and these products will be discussed
afterwards.

The Products

Lobsters- 25% of the lobsters consumed in the United States
come from Canadian waters. This amount represents 75% of all
Canadian lobster exports. In 1985, 12,230 metric tons of
lobster valued at $116 million were exported to the U.S.
That is an increase of 16% in volume and 17% in value from
the previous year. According to Robert D. Lewis, a research
scientist for the Maine Department of Marine Resources,
imports pose the greatest threat to the survival of the Maine
lobster fishery.67
There had been much discussion among members of the
North Atlantic Fisheries Task Force, that depending upon the
outcome of the groundfish investigation, they may seek duties
on lobsters. Many of the subsidies which were found in the
investigation may also be applicable to lobsters.
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SalmQn- In 1982, the tQP three U.S. fishery expQrts were
fresh and frQzen salmQn, salmon rQe, and canned salmQn.
Indeed, fQr Qver half Qf a century U.S. Pacific salmQn has
dQminated the wQrld market. In recent years hQwever, a majQr
shift in the salmQn supply situatiQn has Qccurred. Fresh
pen-raised salmQn frQm NQrway has develQped and penetrated
new markets, and alsQ displaced traditiQnal U.S. supplied
markets. MQst prQjectiQns indicate that wQrldwide prQductiQn
levels are gQing tQ increase as Japan, SCQtland, Ireland,
Canada, New Zealand, and Chile alsQ begin tQ cQmpete. 68 If
market penetratiQn cQntinues tQ increase at a rapid rate,
requests fQr impQrt relief may be fQrthcQming. Studies will
need tQ be cQnducted in Qrder tQ examine the prQductiQn
incentives which may be granted tQ stimulate this fledgling.
yet highly lucrative industry.
In a related matter, current Canadian regulatiQns
prQhibit the expQrtatiQn Qf any unprQcessed sQckeye Qr pink
salmQn. This creates the situatiQn in which Canadian
prQcessQrs are able tQ impQrt whQle salmQn frQm the U.S.
whenever raw fish frQm Canada is in shQrt supply. HQwever.
U.S . prQcessQrs are unable tQ benefit frQm the availability
Qf Canadian salmQn because Qf their expQrt restrictiQns. This
nQn-reciprQcal arrangement has prQmpted a grQup Qf U.S.
Pacific NQrthwest seafQQd prQcessQrs tQ file a SectiQn 301
petitiQn charging that the Canadian expQrt restrictiQns
cQnstitute an unfair trade practice. They have requested that
the U.S. GQvernment use its negQtiating authQrity tQ have
these trade restrictiQns drQPped. 69
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Scallops- The 1984 ITC Sec. 332 fact-finding report which
preceeded the groundfish investigation also included a
section on scallops . It stated that the value of scallop
imports increased almost

50~

from 1979 to 1983. The leading

exporting nations were Canada, Japan, Iceland, Great Britain,
and Peru. However, the actual volume of Canadian scallop
imports decreased from 19 million pounds in 1979 to 13
million pounds in 1983. On the other hand, Japanese imports
increased dramatically from 7,000 pounds valued at $124,000
in 1979, to 3 million pounds valued at $15 million in 1983.
Scallop imports from Iceland also increased irregularly
during the same period.
Financial data in the 332 report indicated that the
percentage of U.S. scallop vessels reporting net losses fluctuated between 1979 and 1983, with no discernable trend.
Also, primary employment on scallop vessels remained stable.
Finally, ex-vessel scallop prices in Atlantic Canada were
consistently lower than U.S. ex-vessel prices. 70 These
factors would all figure into a CVD investigation. By themselves, they do not reveal anything definite.

Shrimp- The U.S. shrimp market has historically been supplied
about equally by U.S. and foreign shrimp. Recently however,
the market has become dominated by imports. In 1983,

73~

of

the shrimp consumed in the United States was imported. It is
currently the leading seafood export to the United States.
The surge of imports may be attributed to lower landings by
the U.S. fleet, an increase in demand tor shrimp, and an in-
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crease in the production of cultured shrimp (especially from
Ecuador).71 Also, shrimp is imported into the United States
free of any duties. This is particularly bothersome as that
species constitutes one of the most valuable fisheries in the
nation.
The issue of imports is certainly not new to the shrimp
industry. An investigation was instituted on November 17,
1975 under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, in response
to a petition from the National Shrimp Congress. In that
investigation, the ITC determined that shrimp was being
imported into the U.S. in such increased quantities as to be
a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic

shri~p

industry.72 The Commission then determined that adjustment
assistance from the government would remedy the injury, and
so it was made available to affected workers and firms rather
than imposing duties. 73
More recently a fact-finding Sec . 332 investigation was
conducted in order to determine the conditions of competition
facing U.S . shrimpers. In that investigation the ITC found
that shrimp from Mexico, Ecuador, Panama, BraZil, India,
Thailand, Taiwan, Norway, and Peru had contributed to record
imports into the United States between 1980 - 1984. However,
the Commission also found that much of this increase was
attributable to decreased landings, and further that imported
shrimp often does not compete directly with U.S. production.
On the other hand, the report stated that public support of
aquaCUlture, particularly in the development of hatcheries,
is likely to stimulate further production and shipment of
shrimp to the U.S. The 332 investigation additionally found
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that many of the input costs, such as fuel and financing, are
often subsidized by the exporting nations. 74
There is no question that the U.S. shrimp industry is
experiencing difficult times. Unfortunately, it may be difficult to obtain relief from imports because they are only one
factor among many in causing the hardship. The fact that most
of the imported shrimp is destined for markets other than
those supplied by U.S . shrimp will not make the task any
easier .

Surimi- A bill establishing a

6.5~

tariff was introduced by

Alaskan Senator Frank Murkowski in December , 1985. The tariff
was requested because Japan imposes a similar tariff on
surimi imports. The outcome of this situation is currently
uncertain. 75

~-

Between 1981 and 1983 , tuna imports increased by almost

73 percent. Most of this tuna came from Thailand, Phillipines, Japan, Taiwan, and Malaysia. Due to a historical
anomaly, tuna packed in oil recieves a

35~

whereas waterpack tuna recieves only a

6~

Aa valorem duty

or

12~

duty.

Therefore most imported tuna is packed in water to take
advantage of the lower rate. This creates a problem for the
U.S. industry because tuna packed in water is the fastest
growing segment of the market, yet our tariff schedules
encourage its importation .
In a Section 201 investigation conducted during 1984
both types of tuna were classified as the same prOduct,
"canned tuna ." Also, because of the level of vertical inte-
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gration the "domestic industry" was determined to consist of
both fishermen and processors. In that investigation, the ITC
found that increased imports had not caused "serious injury"
to the U.S. tuna industry. Unlike the test in a countervailing duty investigation, imports must be the leading cause of
injury in a 201 investigation. Fleet overexpansion during the
late 1970's and a shift in the location of the major fishing
grounds ranked ahead of imports as causes of injury.76
Today. a myriad of safety, environmental. and wage
regulations have combined with imports to cripple the once
prosperous industry . It is unlikely that countervailing or
antidumping duties can restore the U.S tuna fleet to its
former prominence. Perhaps the best that can happen is to
eliminate the antiquated and highly arbitrary discrepancy
between tuna packed in water and that in oil.

Impact of the Groundfish Case on Other Seafood Imports

This concludes the discussion of imports and their
effects on other sectors of the U.S. fishing industry. Without question. their impact is significant. However, because
of the unique characteristics of each fishery. the appropriiate remedy is not always a countervailing duty. It will
become apparent as this thesis develops that the Canadian
groundfish investigation will, at best, prove useful in
analyzing the possibility of imposing CVD's on other products
imported from Canada, namely lobsters and scallops. This is
because the countervailable "subsidies" found in the ground-
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fish investigation were determined by the ITA to confer
benefits upon Canada's entire "f i s hi ng industry," including
lobstermen and soallopers. Most likely , many of these same
programs would be found countervailable again . Therefore,
cyn case
hin~e

a~ainst

~

Canadian lobsters or scallops would probably

upon the material injury determ1nation. In the case of

scallops this would probably be difficult to prove as the
financial data and import statistics from the 332 report did
not indicate any definite negative trends . However , as the
outcome of the groundfish investigation will indicate,
"material injury" is not necessarily a high trade impact
standard. Again, each case will inevitably possess its own
nuances. Predicting the outcome is no more certain than a
throw of the dice .
Finally , remember that trade restrictions will usually
be applied only if the imports are traded unfairly. Simply

complaining about the imports will not suffice . Seafood is an
international commodity. and under the appropriate market
conditions it will automatically flow into the United States .
If duties or restrictions cannot be applied, American fisher men and processors must work to enhance their competitive
position in the world marketplace by other means .
This also brings the three introductory chapters to a
close . The evolution of countervailing duty legislation has
been discussed so the reader will have an idea of the
difficulties involved in reaching agreement on the question
of subsidization, and to describe the law as it is currently
interpreted . The other two chapters put the groundfish
investigation into perspective with regards to the larger
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issues of: (1) U.S./Canadian relations, and (2) seafood
imports in general. The next three chapters will focus
exclusively upon the actual countervailing duty investigation
against Canadian groundfish. A concluding chapter will then
summarize all of the relevant points which have been discussed up to that point, in order to support the contention that
the CVD case resulted in few beneficial contributions.
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Chapter IV

INITIATION OP THE 1986/1986 PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST CAlfADIAR GROUlIDPISH

Early Academic Studies and Coniressional Reports

Chapter II highlighted eight separate instances in which
U.S. fishermen have unsuccessfully sought to ohtain relief

.

from Canadian imports. Their only successful attempt was in
the unique case against salt cod. Why was a petition filed
for the ninth time? What was different in this situation?
Despite past failures. the prohlem was simply not forgotten.
This may he attrihuted, in large part, to several studies
published hetween 1977 and 1983 which indicated that Canadian
fisheries intervention had not been eliminated, and that, in
fact, much of it may have heen in violation of the 1979 GATT
Subsidies Code and the U.S. Trade Agreements Act. 77 Beyond
this, the flow of Canadian fish into the U.S. market had
risen significantly, therehy increasing the perception that
these imports were having a negative impact on U.S. fishermen.
These various studies triggered many dehates as they
established a much needed "information pool" on the subject.
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The debate finally reached Congress on November 17, 1981 at a
Senate Committee hearing on U.S.- Canadian trade policies and
their effects on border industries. Academicians, industry
members, and politicians agreed at this hearing that, except
for the aforementioned studies, there was still a lack of
compiled business information to document the effect of
Canadian fisheries subsidization. Therefore, James Salisbury,
president of the Maine Fishermen's Cooperative Association,
requested that the Government officially investigate the
situation. Through the efforts of Senator William Cohen of
Maine, U.S. Special Trade Representative William E. Brock
wrote a letter to ITC Chairman Alfred E. Eckes requesting &
fact-finding investigation under Section 332(g) of the Tariff
Act of 1930. 78

The ITC Section 332 Groundfish

Investi~ation

Specifically, the letter from Mr. Brock asked for a
complete examination of the competitive position of the U.S.
and Canadian groundfish and scallop industries in the
Northeastern U.S. market, including such factors as government assistance. fishery resources and their management,
production levels in the harvesting and processing sectors,
volume of trade, industry integration, employment, product
prices, financial structure, and the effect of exchange rates
on the flow of trade. The investigation began on December 9,
1983 and continued through December of 1984. It focused upon
fresh and frozen whole groundfish (cod, haddock, pollOCk,
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flounder, and sole), groundfish fillets, and scallops .
Information was obtained from field studies , questionnaires,
private individuals and organizations , State, Provincial, and
Federal governments , and finally, from testimony at hearings
held in Boston and Portland.
In the meantime . a fundamental change had taken place in
Canada 's Atlantic provinces. The Canadian Government , recognizing both the importance and continuing deterioriation of
the fishery in these provinces, commissioned the Task Force
on Atlantic Fisheries to conduct a study (The Kirby Report).
and put forth recommendations which would revive the economically depressed fishery and region. 79 Another report was
commissioned by the Government to investigate the performance
of the fishing industry with special reference to the recently implemented Quality Improvement Program (The Shaffer
Report) .80 Following the release of these studies in 1983,
the Government of Canada pledged to pump $198 million into
its Atlantic groundfish industry over the next five
years . 81 A share of the costs were earmarked for improved
quality control, generic groundfish promotion, expanded
export sales . and infrastructure development .

Furthermore.

the Government helped to restructure and refinance two large
fish processing plants in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. These
activities served to reinforce the feelings of resentment
towards Canadian imports on behalf of the U.S. industry.
During the course of the 332 investigation , members of
the New England fishing industry exhibited an unusual degree
of unity and even optimism. Although the ITC report could not
actually determine whether or not Canada was engaged in
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unfair competition, the investigation was regarded by
industry members as a "vote of confidence" from the Federal
Government. After years of discouragement, American fishermen
were finally getting some assistance in documenting their
case against Canada. The 332 investigation even had the
support of some processors who were beginning to feel the
effects of competition from fresh fillets. While generalizations are difficult to make, it is reasonably accurate to
state that there was little or no opposition to the 332
investigation. People were anxious to see the results of the
report before taking any positions.
The unified and optimistic spirit of the U.S. industry
was a key element in the formation of the North Atlantic
Fisheries Task Force. Originally. the Task Force was composed
of 12 representatives from the harvesting sector. and three
from the processing sector. Subsequently. the group was
described in a press release as a "coalition of New England
fishermen and processors." Although the status of the Task
Force would later be challenged. this description was
accurate at the time. Encouraged by academic studies, the
Kirby and Shaffer Reports, and the 332 investigation, these
industry members united for the explicit purpose of obtaining
meaningful relief from Canadian imports.
In November of 1984, the Task Force hired Patton, Boggs
and Blow, a law firm which specializes in trade and international relations. Mr. Bart Fisher was selected as their
legal representative because he was engaged in a somewhat
similar case which Ultimately resulted in the imposition of
antidumping duties on imports of Canadian salt cod. Fisher
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was to study the 332 report when it was released, and then
recommend legal options.
The 332 investigation report was released by the ITC in
mid-December, 1984. Among its most significant findings were
these:
* Government assistance programs appear to favor
Canadian fishermen and processors.
* Canadian producers have held a price advantage
vis-a-vis U.S. producers at the ex-vessel and
wholesale levels.

* Imports of fresh groundfish from Canada increased
"substantially" between 1979 and 1983 .
* Canadian producers are increasing their efforts
at direct marketing in the fresh fillet market.

* The Canadian fishing industry is highly concentrated and integrated in comparison to the U.S.
industry.

* Resource availability favors Canada.
* The Canadian dollar has been stable relative to
the U.S. dollar and therefore has not improved
the competitive position of Canada.

Au~ust

6. 1986: CyP Petition Filed

After studying the report, Fisher was quoted as saying,
"For a 332 which is usually quite bland, this was a very
forceful assertion that they are receiving significant
government assistance. It lays the groundwork for a countervailing duty case." Thus, a countervailing duty was chosen as
the appropriate remedy, rather than an antidumping duty, or
direct relief from the President. Fisher was convinced that
the government assistance programs outlined in the 332,
Kirby, and Shaffer reports were within the scope of those
which are considered countervailable under GATT and the 1979
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Trade Agreements Act. Also a countervailing duty, under the
1979 Trade Agreements Act, would not be subject to a presidential veto or any other political uncertainties. Finally, a
CVD would serve as a tangible reminder to Canada of the
"level playing field" which is expected in international
trade .
The next important, if not crucial decision concerned
the choice of products to be included in the petition.
Previous cases had failed partially as a result of including
frozen products because it was determined that they did not
actually compete with U.S. producers, who predominantly
supply the fresh market . So, frozen products were excluded.
Lobsters and scallops were not included either, as they would
complicate the case significantly, and perhaps because the
case was not as strong for them. Instead, the petition would
only specify fresh whole Atlantic groundfish and groundfish
fillets, with "groundfish" referring to cod, haddock, hake
(red, silver & white), pollock, and flatfish (winter
flounder, summer flounder, yellowtail, gray sole, and dabs).
The International Trade Administration and the International Trade Commission each received copies of the
countertailing duty petition on August 5, 1985. In accordance
with the statute (19 USC 1677), the North Atlantic Fisheries
Task Force alleged that Canadian imports of fresh whole
groundfish and groundfish fillets had benefitted from
extensive subsidization, and that these subsidized imports
caused, or threatened to cause material injury to the U.S.
industries producing those same products.
These two allegations-- subsidies and material injury --
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will be addressed separately in the forthcoming chapters.
While preliminary determinations were handed down in both
instances, only the final determinations will have a lasting
impact. Because of this. more attention will be given to the
final decisions. The question of subsidies will be examined
first.
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Chapter V

INTKRHATIONAL TRADB ADMINISTRATION FINAL ·SUBSIDY· DBCISION

This chapter reviews the ITA final decision in order to
reveal the common elements of those programs which were
designated as "subsidies."

Canadian Goyernment Assistance

Pro~ram6

Drawing largely from Canadian federal and provincial
documents. trade publications, the 332 report. and academic
studies, the North Atlantic Fisheries Task Force alleged in
its petition that 42 separate Canadian programs constituted
countervailable subsidies . During the course of the investigation however, several of the programs listed in the
petition were found to have been either terminated, not used,
not countervailable, or components of larger programs.
Additionally, upon verification the ITA discovered other
countervailable subsidies which had not been mentioned in the
petition. In this study, emphasis will be placed primarily
upon those which were ultimately countervailed in the final
determination.
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Table 3 outlines those programs benefiting Canadian
fishermen and those benefiting Canadian processors.
Individual programs which provide benefits to both groups
have been classified according to the main beneficiary. The
assistance to fishermen is then further categorized into: (1)
vessel construction subsidies, (2) infrastructure subsidies,
and (3) equipment/operating cost subsidies.

Likewise,

assistance to processors is categorized into: (1) capital
grants and loans, (2) preferential tax treatment, (3)
government equity investments, and (4) mark&ting and export
assistance. Wherever possible, the countervailable programs
have been further separated according federal or provinciaJ
administrative jurisdiction.
Notice that Table 3 lists all of the programs which were
countervailed in both the ITA preliminary and final determinations. Only 33 programs were preliminarily countervailed,
whereas 55 were countervailed in the final decision. However,
the preliminary subsidy of 6.85% ad valorem is greater than
the final value of 5.82% ad yalOrem. 82
Table 4 reduces the separate countervailable programs
into 14 major categories which are classified according to
administrative jurisdiction, and by the purpose of the
program. This outline approach is useful for concisely
extracting the underlying principles which the ITA utilized
in its final decision. After describing these programs and
why they were countervailed, they will be contrasted with
those programs which were not. Then, some conclusions will be
drawn concerning the U.S. ITA's interpretation of a countervailable "subsidy" in this case. Finally, there will be a
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TABLE 3

Outline of Countervailable Programs *

Prel.

Final

.743
.030

.715
.043

.143

.150

.003
.015
.187
.015
.004
.006
.034

.003
.014
.181
.015
.004
.006
.028
.144
.021

A. Harvesting Sector
1. Vessel Construction Subsidies
a. Federal Assistance
(1) Fishing Vessel Asst. Program
(2) Fisheries Improvement Loans Program
b. Provincial Assistance
(1) Grant Programs
(a) Newfoundland: Grants for Purchasing
& Constructing Boats
(b) Newfoundland: Grants for Rebuilding
& Repair of Fishing &
Coastal Vessels
(c) Nova Scotia: Fishing Vessel Const Program
(d) Nova Scotia: lnduscrial Development Div.
(e) PEl: Fishing Vessel Subsidy Program
(f) PEl: Near & Offshore Vessel Asst. Program
(g) PEl: Engine Conversion Program
(h) Quebec: Vessel Constr. Asst. Program
(i) Quebec: Large Vessel Constr. Program
(j) Quebec: Grants for Engine Purchases

(2) Loan Programs
(a) New Brunswick: Loans from Fisheries Dev.
Board
.028
(b) New Brunswick: Interest Rate Rebates
(c) Newfoundland: Loans & Guarantees from
Fisheries Loan Board
.159
(d) Nova Scotia: Loans from F.L.B.
.363
(e) PEl: Commercial Fishermens Investment
Incentives Program
.003
(f) Quebec: Loans from Ministry of Agriculture
Fisheries & Food
2. Infrastructure Subsidies
a. Federal Assistance
(1) Special Recovery Capital Projects Program
(2) Pref. User Fees under Small Craft Harbors
b. Provincial Assistance
(1) New Brunswick: Fish Unloading Systems &
Icemaking Program
(2) Newfoundland: Construction & Repair of
Fisheries Facilities

.259
.018
.258
.375
.003
.045

.079
.046

.006

* note: all values represent % ad valorem

.010
.009
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TABLE 3

(cent.)

Prel.

Final

.060

.059

.001

.003
.001
.001

3 . Equipment & Operating Cost Subsidies
a. Quality Enhancement
(1) Fed. Asst. for Constr. of Icemaking &
Fish Chilling Facilities
(2) PEI: Asst. for Constr. of Icemaking &
Fish Chilling Facilities
(3) PEI: Technical Upgrading Program
(4) PEI: Onboard Fish Handling Systems Program
b. Grants for Gear, Gear Maintenance, & Bait
(1) New Brunswick: Technical Services
(2) Newfoundland: Enhancement of Fishing
Operations
(3) Newfoundland: Operations of Fisheries
Facilities & Services
(4) PEI: Fish Box Pool
(5) Quebec: Gear Subsidy Program

.028

c. Insurance
(1) New Brunswick: Insurance Premium Prepayment
Program
(2) Quebec: Insurance Premium Subsidy Program
(3) Federal Fishing Vessel Insurance Plan

.004
.044
.187

.015
.001
.001
.002
.041

.004
.043
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TABLE 3

(cant.)

Prel.

Final

2.102

.447
.001

B. Processing Sector
1. Capital Grants and Loans
a. Federal Assistance
(1) Regional Development Incentives Program
(2) Industrial & Regional Development Program
b. Joint Federal & Provincial Assistance
(11 Agricultural & Rural Development Agreements
(21 PEl: Comprehensive Development Plan
(31 General Development Agreements
(41 Transitional Programs
(51 Economic & Regional Development Agreements
(61 Interest Free Loans to Natl. Sea Products

.043

. 002

.005
.039
.181
.060

. 283

.007

.018

c. Provincial Assistance
(11 Newfoundland: Grants to Cover Operating
Expenses
(21 PEl: Fishing Industry Technology Program
(31 PEl: Technology Improvements Program
(41 Quebec: Grants for Fish Transport and
Seafood Processing Tanks
(51 Quebec: Grants to Processing Enterprises
for Capital Equipment
(61 Quebec: Icemaking & Fish Chilling Assistance
2. Preferential Tax Treatment
a. Regional Based Investment Tax Credit
3. Government E~uity Investments
a. Govt. Equity Infusions in NSP and FPI
4. Marketing and Export Assistance
a. Federal Assistance
(11 Program for Export Market Development
(21 DFO Promotions Branch

.096
.012
.002
.029
. 109
.077

.166

.162

2.188

1. 876

.005

.001
.001

.001

b. Provincial Assistance
(11 Newfoundland: Marketing Assistance
(21 Nova Scotia: Market Development Assistance
(31 PEl: Fresh Fish Marketing Program

.001
.008
.090

5":"'8i""i

source: ITA Preliminary & Final decisions
(51 FR 1010 & 51 FR 10041)
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TABLE 4
11

Reduced Outline of Countervailable Programs
Prel .

Final

.773

.758

b. Provincial Assistance
(1) Grant Programs
(2) Loan Programs

.407
.553

.566
.958

2. Infrastructure Subsidies
a. Federal Assistance
b. Provincial Assistance

.006

.125
.019

3. Equipment & Operating Cost Subsidies
a. Quality Enhancement
b. Grants for Gear, Gear Maintenance, & Bait
c. Insurance
d. Fuel & Gear Tax Exemptions

.061
.028
.235
.007

.064
.060
.047

2.136
.285

.448
.310
.325

.166

.162

2.188

1.876

.006

.002
.099
5.82\

A. Harvesting Sector
1 . Vessel Construction Subsidies
a. Federal Assistance

B. Processing Sector
1. Capital Grants and Loans
a. Federal Assistance
b. Joint Federal and Provincial Assistance
c. Provincial Assistance
2. Preferential Tax Treatment
3. Government Equity Investments
4. Marketing and Export Assistance
a. Federal Assistance
b. Provincial Assistance

6.85'

11

note: all values represent , ~ YAlgrem

source: ITA Preliminary , Final Decisions
(51 FR 1010 ,

51 FR 10041)
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short discussion on the ITA'S important decision with regards
to the legal status of the North Atlantic Fisheries Task
Force.
Very little attention will be devoted to describing the
manner in which the ITA calculated the actual ad valorem
subsidy amount. Essentially. they employed the procedures
mandated by the "Subsidies Appendix" (49 FR 18006). as was
discussed earlier in Chapter 1 and in Appendix C. In this
particular case, the ITA used the long-term corporate bond
rate in Canada as the appropriate discount rate. They
allocated benefits for fishing vessels over 18 years, for
private wharves and slipways over 16 years, for fish boxes
over four years. and all other assets over 12 years. The
annual subsidy for each program was then diffused over the
f.o.b. value of production of all fish and shellfish for
Atlantic Canada. The decision to use this particular
denominator was rather surprising, and will be discussed
again later.

Pro~rams Desi~nated

as Counteryailable "Subsidies"

Please refer to Tables 3 and 4 while following this
discussion. The format is the same as Table 4.

A. HARVESTING SECTOR

1. Vessel Construction Subsidies
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a. federal assistance

Grants under the Fishing Vessel Assistance Program
(FVAP) provide assistance for up to 25% of the costs involved
with constructing. modifying or converting fishing vessels
less than 75 ft. The ITA determined that these grants were
limited to a specific enterprise or industry. or group of
enterprises or industries. Therefore. under Section 771
(5)(B)(iv) of the Act (TAA-79). because they were limited to
vessels used by commercial fishermen. the FVAP grants were
countervailed.
Under the Fisheries Improvement Loans Program
(FILP). the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans guarantees loans
made by banks and other commercial lenders for the purchase.
repair. and construction of vessels. equipment. water supply
systems. or other structures related to commercial fishing .
Loans and guarantees under the FILP were determined by the
ITA to be limited to one specific industry (the fishing
industry). However. under Section 771 (5)(B)(i) the ITA had
to further determine whether the loans or guarantees were
provided "on terms inconsistent with commercial
considerations." Because there was a 1% fee charged on loan
guarantees under other federal and provincial programs.
whereas there was no fee (0%) under the FILP. the ITA ruled
that the actual iuarantee was countervailable. However. after
comparing the interest rate under a guaranteed FILP loan
(prime plus 1%) to a government loan absent the guarantee
(prime plus 1%). the actual FILP

lQAD

was not considered

"inconsistent with commercial considerations." and not
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countervailed .

b. provincial assistance

(1) Grant Programs
In each instanoe , provincial grants providing for
the purohase , oonstruction and repair of vessels and equipment were considered countervailable because the grants were
limited exclusively to the fishing industry .

(2) Loans and Loan Guarantees
After comparing the different fixed and variable
interest rates under the provincial loan programs to the
appropriate long and short -term benchmark interest rates . the
ITA ruled that these loans for the purchase, construction,
and repair of fishing vessels and equipment were "inconsistent with commercial considerations." Because they were also
limited to a specific industry, or group of industries (the
fishing industry), these provincial loans for vessel
construction and repair were countervailed.
Loan guarantees were countervailed because they
were limited to a specific industry , and because there was no
charge for the guarantee, whereas under similar programs a 1%
fee is usually charged.

2 . Infrastructure Subsidies (federal S provincial)

In general, under Section 771 (5)(B)(ii) the
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provision of goods and services will only be countervailed if
they are provided at a "preferential rate." Therefore, the
ITA will not countervail projects which provide service to a
wide variety of user groups. Examples of such projects
include highways, bridges, harbors, electricity. water

supp~y

systems. and phone service. This is why only a tiny fraction
of the Small Harbors Program was countervailed. Only
preferential berthage fees to commercial fishermen
constituted the "provision of a service at a preferential
rate. "
Funds disbursed under the Special Recovery Capital
Projects Program, the New Brunswick Fish Unloading Systems &
Icemaking Program, and the Newfoundland Construction & Repair
of Fisheries Facilities were considered grants which were
limited exclusively to the fishing industry. Therefore, these
grants for infrastructure development were countervailed.

3. Equipment/Operating Cost Subsidies

a . quality enhancement
Each of these programs (federal & provincial)
provided grants for the construction of icemaking and fish
chilling facilities . Because the grants were limited
specifically to the fishing industry, they were countervailable.
b. grants for gear, gear maintenance, and bait
Similarly these programs, which provided grants for

-79longline equipment. shellfish traps. hooks. leaders and
lines. were limited exclusively to the fishing industry.
Therefore. under Section 771 (5)(B)(iv) they were countervailable.
The PEI Fish Box Pool provided fish boxes at cost
to harvesters. The fishermen had the choice of purchasing the
boxes or taking a 5 year.

5~

loan. Because six loans were

still outstanding during the ITA review period. they were
considered "inconsistent with commercial considerations," and
countervailed.

c. insurance
Under the New Brunswick Insurance Premium
Prepayment Program. the Department of Fisheries purchased
insurance on behalf of fishing vessel loan recipients, and
included the costs in the annual premium paid on the loan.
The insurance loans were only available to vessels financed
through the New Brunswick Fisheries Development Board
(NBFDB), and were available at the same interest rates as
those charged under the NBFDB for fishing vessels. After
comparing the interest rate charged on these insurance
prepayment loans with a benchmark loan, the ITA ruled that
they were "inconsistent with commercial considerations ."
Because the loans were also limited exclusively to commercial
fishermen. the program was countervailed.
The Quebec Insurance Premium Subsidy Program
provided reimbursements to participants equal to

50~

of the

cost of vessel insurance. The ITA considered this to be a
grant which was provided exclusively to the fishing industry,
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thereby conferring a countervailable benefit.

B. PROCESSING SECTOR

1. Capital Grants and Loans

a. federal assistance

The Regional Development Incentives Program (RDIP)
and the Industrial and Regional Development Program (IRDP)
provided grants for capital investments to manufacturers in
rural areas. for the purpose of stimulating the economy and
prOViding jobs. In Certain Softwood Products from Canada (48
FR 24159), the ITA found these same two programs countervailable because the designation of areas eligible for such
assistance was based upon administrative discretion. In other
words. the ITA has consistently held that benefits prOVided
on a regional basis are. by their very nature. provided to a
specific group of enterprises or industries.

Because this

was a grant program provided to a specific group of enterprises. it was held countervailable.

b. joint federal S provincial assistance

Joint federal/provincial assistance programs were
usually implemented for promoting the economic development
of the fishing industry in rural areas . These programs
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(usually grants) provided funds for a wide range of
activities including water supply systems, bait freezing
units, bait sheds, computer systems, processing machinery,
ice machines. and transportation equipment.
An analysis of joint federal/provincial programs is
useful in interpreting the "regional benefits" criteria which
was decisive in the previous section (RDIP M IRDP grants). If
funding for a program (a grant) is available from both
provincial and federal sources, and the federal money is
conditional upon regional preferences, whereas the provincial
funding is available to all industries throughout the
province, then only the federal money will be countervailed
under the "regional benefits" criteria. The provincial
portion will be countervailed only if it is available to a
specific industry or subregion of the province.
Such was the case with jointly funded programs in
the groundfish investigation. Federal funds were countervailed under the "regional benefits" test, whereas provincial
funding was only countervailed under the "specific industry"
test.
The other program in this category, Interest Free
Loans to National Sea Products from provincial and federal
sources, was held entirely countervailable because the loans
were: (1) limited to National Sea Products (a specific enterprise), and (2) "inconsistent with commercial considerations"
because there was no interest charged.

c. provincial assistance
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Five of these six programs provided grants to
seafood processors for the purpose of covering operating
expenses, installing computer technology, and for other
capital investments. Therefore, these grant programs
conferred countervailable benefits because they were limited
to a specific industry.
The icemaking and fish chilling assistance program
was countervailable under Section 771 (5)(B)(ii) because it
provided "goods or service at preferential rates." In this
particular instance, the government provided processors with
ice at 53% of cost .

2. Preferential Tax Treatment

There are four different categories of investment
tax credits (ITCs) in Canada. The first category of ITC is
for investment in "qualified property," such as new plants
and equipment used in manufacturing or processing. The basic
ITC for investment in "qualified property" is seven percent.
An additional three or thirteen percent is available for
"qualified property" used in certain regions. The second
category of ITC is for investment in "certified property."
The distinguishing factor between "qualified property" and
"certified property" is that the latter must be located in
prescribed regions characterized by high levels of unemployment and low per capita income. The ITC rate for "certified
property· is 50%.
The basic seven percent rate for "qualified
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property" is not limited to a specific industry or region and
therefore, was not countervailable. However, the additional
rates above the basic seven percent were countervailable
because they were contingent upon regional preferences.

3. Government Equity Investments

The federal government of Canada and the Provinces
of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland purchased shares of equity as
part of the restructuring of several major harvesters and
processors into National Sea Products (NSP) and Fishery
Products International (FPI) during 1983 and 1984,
respectively.
The ITA has consistently held that government
provision of equity does not per se confer a countervailable
benefit. Equity infusions bestow countervailable benefits
only when they occur on terms "inconsistent with commercial
considerations." To make these determinations in the groundfish case, the ITA analyzed financial statements, financial
forecasts, and the terms of the restructuring of the two
firms.
The determination that Fishery Products
International was "unequityworthy" (a term which was not
described) at the time of its reorganization rested primarily
upon; (1) the poor profitability of the smaller companies
merged into FPI, and (2) the ITA's analysis of FPI's future
profitability after the merger. To support this, the ITA
noted that the predecessor companies had performed miserably
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between 1981 and 1983, and that future fish stock projections
were uncertain at best. Furthermore, although private
investors had been sought by the company, none were willing
to invest in the restructuring under the same conditions that
the federal and provincial governments did. Therefore the FPI
equity infusions were deemed countervailable.
The ITA determined also that the equity infusions
by the federal government and by the province of Nova Scotia
into National Sea Products during 1984 were "inconsistent
with commercial considerations." This decision hinged upon an
analysis which indicated that the expected return on the
shares of NSP stock purchased by the government were below
the expected returns which would be required by a private
investor under similar circumstances. No further information
was given.
Incidentally, according to National Sea's 1985
annual report, the company is now profitable showing a net
income of C$10 million in 1985 versus a 1984 loss of C$18
million. Though federal and provincial governments own some
publicly traded stock in NSP, the company is a private
sector, publicly owned company. In contrast, FPI of St .
Johns, Newfoundland is still primarily owned by the federal
government of Canada, the province of Newfoundland and the
Bank of Nova Scotia . It is not a private sector company. In
1985, when FPI experienced operating losses, the company
recieved additional money from these sources. 83
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4. Marketing and Export Assistance

a. federal assistance

The countervailable portions of the funds disbursed
under the Department of Fisheries (DFO) Promotions Branch,
and the Program for Export Market Development (PEKD) were
determined to be prohibited "export subsidies," as described
in Section 771 (5)(A) and in Chapter 1. Specifically, these
prohibited activities included promotional activities at
international trade shows funded by the federal government,
international market identification, international market
development, and the hosting of foreign buyers. Federal
assistance in the development of Canadian markets was not
held countervailable.

b. provincial assistance

Grants for marketing assistance provided to
Newfoundland processors were limited to a specific industry.
and thus countervailable.
The publication and distribution of federally
funded promotional materials for potential U.S. buyers was
considered a prohibited "export subsidy."
Similarly, the arrangement of a contractual
marketing agreement by a provincial government with a New
England firm constituted an "export subsidy."

-86Programs Which Were Not Considered "Subsidies"

1) Shipbuilders Assistance Program
The Shipbuilders Assistance Program provides grants
to shipbuilders for vessels greater than 75' in length. The
current level of assistance is 9% of cost. The program was
not countervailed because grants were provided directly to
shipbuilders and not to commercial fishermen.

2) Small Craft Harbors Program
Under this program, the Small Craft Harbors
Directorate has the responsibility for maintaining and
operating over 2,000 small craft harbors, which range from
large, modern facilities to minor installations serving
isolated communities. Because these harbors are used by all
commercial vessels and recreational boaters, they are not
provided to a specific industry at preferential rates, and
were not countervailed.

3) Newfoundland Bait Services Program
The Government of Newfoundland operated a program
which provided bait for commercial fishermen during temporary
shortages. Although the program was targeted to a specific
industry, the bait was sold at a price comparable to
commercial prices and not at preferential rates . It,
therefore. was not countervailed.

4) Fishing Vessel Insurance Plan
The Fishing Vessel Insurance Plan (FVIP) operated
by the federal government was considered countervailable in
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the preliminary determination because information had not
been provided on premium rates charged for identical or
similar insurance. Upon verification, the ITA found that FVIP
premiums were comparable to those charged by commercial
insurers, and in some instances were higher. In recent years
many commercial fishermen have switched from FVIP to private
insurance to take advantage of their lower premiums. Therefore, FVIP does not offer insurance at preferential rates and
consequently did not confer a countervailable benefit.

5) Fuel and Gear Tax Exemptions
Taxes for diesel fuel were reimbursed to commercial
fishermen under several programs. The purpose of the fuel tax
was to improve roads and highways throughout Canada. Therefore, operators of all offroad machinery were eligible for
diesel fuel tax exemptions, including operators of construction machinery, farm machinery, logging machinery,
recreational boaters, and commercial fishermen. Because these
exemptions were not limited to a specific industry, they were
not countervailed.
Under a separate program, anyone who purchased
manufacturing equipment which was not available in Canada was
eligible for an exemption from import duties. Again, these
exemptions were not limited to a specific industry.

6) Seasonal Unemployment Benefits for Fishermen
Section 146 of the Unemployment Insurance Act
authorizes the Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission
to operate and establish a system of unemployment insurance
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for self-employed fishermen. Part V of the Unemployment
Regulations cover self-employed fishermen. and are known as
the "Fishermen's Regulations." Under the Fishermen's
Regulations, the buyer of the catch is considered the
employer of the fisherman. All of the provisions of the Act
and the general regulations apply to fishermen. except where
they are modified by the Fishermen's Regulations.
In order for the unemployment insurance to be
deemed a subsidy. it must be proven that the insurance was
provided on preferential terms to a specific industry. After
comparing the terms of unemployment insurance provided under
the Fishermen's Regulations with those provided under the
Unemployment Insurance Act and Regulations. the ITA determined that the commercial fishermen's unemployment insurance
was not provided on preferential terms. The following
observations were cited as evidence : (1) premiums paid under
both programs are the same. (2) the required number of weeks
worked in order to qualify for benefits is the same under
both programs. (3) the benefit levels for each program are
both set at 60% of average insurable earnings, and (4) the
number of extended benefit weeks available to both groups of
workers is the same.
Thus. the ITA analyzed the Unemployment Insurance
Program for Self-Employed Fishermen in terms of whether or
not it constituted "the provision of goods or services at
preferential rates" (771 (5)(B)(ii)). On the other hand. the
lawyer for N.A.F.T.F. argued that the regular provision of
these funds was. in actuality. a guaranteed annual transfer
payment from the Canadian government which prevented many
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able.

8) Marketing Programs
This category covers several separate programs
including: (1) DFO Marketing Intelligence and Promotion
Activities. (2) New Brunswick: Marketing and Promotion
Activities. (3) Newfoundland: Market Development Information
Service. (4) Newfoundland: Market and Product Development
Program. and (5) Newfoundland : Small Business Program. These
are all mentioned because similar programs operate in the
United States.
DFO Marketing Intelligence and Industry Services is
the Canadian counterpart to the U.S. Fishery Market News
(Green and Blue Sheets). These market reports are used by a
wide variety of groups, and are a legitimate government
function. They do not provide direct financial benefits
exclusively to the fishing industry.
The Market Development Information Service provides
information on a variety of topics related to the Canadian
fishing industry to anyone who requests such information.
This is somewhat similar to NOAA/NMFS/Sea Grant reports. They
do not benefit any particular industry.
Marketing and Promotion Activities and the Small
Business Program are available to any small business in
Canada which needs assistance in a wide range of activities
including marketing and promotion, bookkeeping, economic
forecasting, hiring, etc. This advice is not contingent upon
export and does not confer a benefit to any specific
industry. These programs are analogous to the U.S. Small
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Business Administration.

Conclusion from the ITA Final Determination

An analysis of countervailable and non-countervailable
programs provides some very fundamental information about
subsidies. The first, and oftentimes most important, criteria
is whether or not a government program is
benefits to a specific industry or

~roup

tar~eted

to provide

of industries. In

the particular case against Canadian groundfish, this meant a
"group of industries" consisting of both the salt water fishing industry and the seafood products industry, simply labeled the "fishing industry."
It is important to note that the lawyer for the Fisheries Council of Canada made reference to another countervailing duty investigation involVing Liye Swine and Pork Products
from Canada (60 FR 26097), in which the ITA did DQ1 countervail farm loan programs which provided benefits to all
agricultural sectors (meats, grains, dairy goods, fruits,
vegetables, etc.), because these programs were not deemed
limited to a "specific industry." In contrast, although the
"fishing industry" produces several products (fresh, frozen,
and salted groundfish fillets, whole groundfish, lobsters,
bivalves, pelagics, etc.), and programs such as the Fisheries
Improvement Loans Program benefit many of these sectors, the
program was nonetheless countervailable. The ITA asserted
that the fishing industry is not analogous to the agricultural sector because it does not contain the same diverse
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range of productive activities.
In combining the "salt water fishing industry" and the
"seafood products industry" into 'simply the "fishing
industry," the ITA also averted the task of calculating two
separate subsidies for whole fish and fillets. Surprisingly,
benefits provided to the "fishing industry" (fishermen and
processors) were allocated over the f.o.b. value of production (not the value of landings) of all fish and shellfish
for Atlantic Canada. By including shellfish in the
denominator, the subsidy conferred upon whole groundfish and
fillets (the products subject to the investigation) was
reduced considerably . Similarly, it is not unreasonable to
assume that an ad valorem subsidy for fillets would be
different from the

~

valorem subsidy on whole fish because

of the additional value added through processing.
Nevertheless, the ITA justified this as the "appropriate
denominator" because they were "dealing with aggregate data."
Essentially, the ITA approached the "specific industry"
question as broadly as possible by designating one industry
and by calculating one

~

valorem subsidy.

A government program will also qualify as being provided
to a "specific group of industries" if benefits are only
available to producers in a certain region.
The "specificity test" is all that is required for a
grant program to be countervailed. Loans, loan guarantees,
equity infusions, and government provision of goods and
services require additional findings.
Did the government assume risks which those in the
private sector would not have undertaken? This question must
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be asked when analyzing loans, loan guarantees, and equity
infusions to see if they are countervailable. The term
"inconsistent with commercial considerations" is usually
measured by referring to a benchmark interest rate, or, in
the case of equity infusions, to market prices and return on
investment.
With regards to the provision of goods and services, one
must ask whether or not they were provided on preferential
terms. This is usually quantified by reference to market
prices (vessel insurance, berthage fees, ice, bait, etc.), or
similar services (unemployment insurance) .
Finally, the ITA will countervail government programs
which are clearly designed to promote exports, or are
contingent upon exports. Examples of export subsidies in the
groundfish investigation included federally funded trade show
promotions, and contractual marketing agreements.
Programs which benefit a wide range of industries (small
business assistance, basic scientific research, infrastructure development, fuel tax exemptions, etc.) will
usually not be countervailed. Similarly, programs which
constitute a legitimate function of government such as
resource management, product grading, and the publication of
market news are not likely subsidies. Also, those programs
which did not confer benefits to the product under investigation, such as the Shipbuilders Assistance Program, were not
countervailed .
No "upstream subsidies" were discovered in the
investigation.
Table 5 consolidates the programs designated as

-94"subsidies" even further. It indicates that three categories
of programs accounted for 90% of the final a4 valorem
subsidy. These are: (1) vessel construction subsidies (grants
Sloans). (2) government equity infusions to NSP and FPI. and
(3) capital grants and loans to processors. Table 5 also
reveals that the top five individual programs in the final
determination accounted for a significant 83% of the 5.82%
final value. These individual programs were: (1) equity
infusions. (2) federal Fishing Vessel Assistance Program
(grants). (3) Regional Development Incentives Program
(grants). (4) Nova Scotia: loans from Fisheries Loan Board.
and (5) New Brunswick: loans from Fisheries Development
Board .
Benefits were rather evenly distributed among the five
individual provinces in the final determination. However,
Nova Scotia consistently ranked above the others. In the
preliminary determination. federal funding was much more
significant than provincial funds. This difference was
modified in the final decision. largely because of the
reduction in the valuation of the Regional Development
Incentives Program. The reduction in the valuation of RDIP
is the main reason why the final value was less than the
preliminary value. Other than mentioning some modifications
in calculating benefits more accurately, the ITA gave no
further indication why there was such a significant decrease
in the subsidy conferred by RDIP (2.101% to

.447~).

There is

no doubt that it had an impact on the outcome. Only 33
programs were countervailed in the preliminary decision and
the subsidy was

6.85~.

whereas 55 programs were countervailed
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in the final and the value was

5.82~.

Upon conclusion of this chapter it is noteworthy to
mention that, throughout the ITA investigation, the Fisheries
Council of Canada maintained that the countervailing duty
petition had not been filed "on behalf of" the northeastern
U.S. fishing industry . If this could have been proven, the
case might have been dismissed . The ITA, in response , stated
that neither the 1979 Act nor the Commerce Regulations
require a petitioner to establish that it has the support of
a majority of the industry . They would accept the petitioners
standing unless the Fisheries Council of Canada, represented
by O'Melveney & Myers, could prove otherwise.
Undeniably, a number of U.S. processors opposed the case
on whole fish, but this was disregarded by the ITA because
processors do not produce whole fish. The ITA also recieved a
submission from the "Task Force for the Survival of American
Fishermen, Processing Plants and Jobs," a group claiming to
account for a major proportion of groundfish fillet production, and a significant amount of whole domestic groundfish .
The group stated its opposition to the investigation on both
filleted and whole groundfish, but was opposed to terminating
just on fillets. The "Survival Task Force," however. was not
able to prove that it accounted for a major proportion of
domestic whole groundfish landings.

Because the group did

not wish to terminate on fillets, the ITA held that the
opposition did not reach a level which would substantiate
claims that the petition was not filed "on behalf of" either
domestic industry .
The respondents attempted to capitalize on the apparent
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lack of decisiveness which characterized U.S. processors
throughout the investigation. The processors were never able
to decide their position among themselves. Needless to say.
the petition hardly had the unanimous support of the U.S.
industry. especially processors. Ultimately however. this
opposition could not be quantified in a manner which would
terminate the investigation against both products. The
question was raised later again in the ITC decision, and will
be discussed further in the next chapter.
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Chapter VI

IBTBRNATIOBAL TRADB CODISSION -KATBRIAL INJURY- DBCISION

The term "material injury" is statutorily defined in
Sec. 771 (7) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 as "harm
which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." .
Chapter VI explores how this vague definition was applied
in the groundfish case. In a very real sense, the meaning of
the definition remains highly flexible. depending upon the
circumstances surrounding a case. The final decision handed
down by the ITC is either "affirmative" or "negative" on
whether the domestic industry has experienced "material
injury" by reason of the subsidized imports. This question is
usually answered by reference to a mixed bag of economic
principles, legal principles, and the ideological tendencies
of the six ITC Commissioners.

Definin2 the domestic "industry"

Before the ITC analyzes the condition of the domestic
industry for the purpose of assessing material injury, it is
first required to define the scope of the domestic industry.
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The Commission's decision in this matter may have ultimately
been the single most important factor affecting the long-term
implications of the groundfish case.
The reader will recall that the term "industry" is
statutorily defined in Sec. 771 (4)(A) as "the domestic
producers as a whole of a like product." "Like product," in
turn is defined as a "product which is like, or in the
absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses
with, the articles subject to an investigation." Recall that
the articles subject to this investigation were imported
fresh whole and fresh fillets of Atlantic groundfish,
including cod, haddock, pollock, hake (red, silver, & white),
and flatfish (winter flounder, summer flounder, yellowtail,
gray sole, and dabs). There was no dispute over the decision
to specify two "like products"-- fresh whole Atlantic groundfish and fresh Atlantic groundfish fillets. The dispute
focused upon the relevant industries which produce these two
"like products." Without question, U.S . Atlantic fishermen
"produce" fresh, whole, Atlantic groundfish . But, what is the
scope of the U.S. industry which produces fillets? Is it only
the processing sector or should fishermen also be included?
The petitioner (NAFTF) argued for including fishermen
with processors in the fillet producing industry.85 By
accepting this method, an analysis of material injury by
reason of imported Canadian fillets would have to examine the
financial condition of

~

fishermen and processors. Seeing

as the ITC later ruled in their final decision that fishermen
were being injured as a result of imported whole fish, the
case for fillets would have been that much stronger. In other
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words. although the ITC may have decided that U.S. processors
were not materially injured by the Canadian fillets. they
might have ruled that U.S. fishermen were. A countervailing
duty might then have been imposed on the fillets. because at
least one sector of the U.S. industry producing fillets
(fishermen) was injured.
On the other hand. the respondent (Fisheries Council of
Canada) argued for including only processors in the fillet
producing industry.88
Because of the oftentimes interdependent relationship
between growers and processors. the inquiry into the scope of
the domestic industry is unique in the case of processed
agricultural products. The Commission has addressed this
issue many times before (see Appendix F). As discussed in the
Table Wines case. the ITC has exercised discretion when
including both the growers of the raw agricultural product
and the producers of the processed product into a single
industry. Accordingly. they have developed a special twoprong test to determine if growers should be included in the
processing industry. The two-prong test focuses upon:
(1) whether the raw agricultural product enters a
single. continuous line of production resulting in one end product. and
(2) whether a direct economic tie exists between
the growers and the processors.
An analysis of previous agricultural investigations
indicates that both of these factors have been persuasive in
the outcome. For example. in T8.ble lines. the ITC did not
include first-tier producers with second-tier producers
because there were important alternative uses for the raw
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agricultural product (grapes). such as table grapes and
raisins. The theory behind this test is that first-tier
producers can shift to these alternative markets. if they
exist, in order to avoid the adverse impact of processed
imports. 87
Essentially. the second factor is used to differentiate
between those situations in which growers and processors
function as a single industry from those in which growers are
merely suppliers of the raw material with divergent interests
from the processors. If there is substantial interlocking
ownership. shared revenues. or if, contractually, the prices
paid to producers directly control the prices to growers,
this theory maintains that both groups may be affected by
imports in a similar manner. 88 The second prong has been
decisive in
Qran~e

Qran~e

Juice, Lamb Meat, and Raspberries. In

Juice 80 percent of all the oranges used to produce

frozen concentrated juice were either processed by grower
owned, non-profit cooperatives or under participation
contracts. In Lamb Meat, two major packers were owned by
feedlot owners, one packer was owned by growers, and two
packing companies were fully integrated. These five packers
accounted for more than 50 percent of the domestic packer
capacity. Furthermore, a number of commercial-scale feedlots
were owned by growers. In Raspberries, the Commission found
that 35 percent of the domestic raspberry crop was grown by
growers who maintained bulk packing facilities and, that the
majority of bulk packers were grower/packers.
The groundfish investigation most closely parallels the
recent ITC decision in Liye Sw1ne and Pork from Canada. In

-102-

that case, the Commission also determined that there were two
like products-- live swine and pork. Again, the two-prong
test was applied . The "single. continuous line of production"
criteria was met in that the raw product was sold primarily
in one market. and the primary purpose of raising slaughter
hogs is to produce pork meat. However, the requisite "integration of economic interest" (the second factor) was lacking
because: (1) less than 5 percent of the packing facilities
were owned by growers, (2) none of the grower facilities were
owned by packers, and (3) prices for hogs were not linked by
contract to the prices recieved by packers. The Commission
went on to say that "while the absence of a legal relationship between growers and processors is not determinative of
the absence of economic integration, (the ITC) is unpersuaded
by the petitioner's contention that an integration of
economic interest can be reflected solely by a high price
correlation between live swine and fresh pork." Therefore,
because the second prong was not met they ruled that the two
relevant industries were defined as follows: a domestic
industry consisting of hog growers which produces live swine,
and a domestic industry consisting exclusively of pork
packers which produces fresh pork.
Significantly, in the final Liye Swine and Pork decision
ITC Vice-Chairman Liebeler offered a dissenting view in which
she questioned the two-prong test as it is used by the
Commission in agricultural cases. She stated that based
solely upon the statutory language, it might never be
appropriate to include growers in the industry producing the
processed product. If, on the other hand, sometimes it is

-103-

appropriate to include growers. then there is some basis for
the "single line of production" test (lst prong). but not the
"economic integration" test (2nd prong) as this test is being
interpreted by the ITC. She continued by stating that an
analysis of the legal relationship between processors and
growers "makes little economic sense." The share of the
injury incurred by growers from processed imports will depend
upon the share of their product that goes into the final
product. and the relevant elasticities of supply. It has
nothing to do with the form of contract. or legal relationship. between growers and processors.
This is precisely the argument which Fisher used in his
pre-hearing brief before the ITC final groundfish determination. In the preliminary

rUlin~.

the Commission had found two

like products-- whole fish and fillets . They also ruled that
the industry producing fillets consisted of both fishermen
and processors. In making this decision. the ITC focused
primarily upon the fact that approximately 90 percent of the
raw product. fresh whole groundfish. is sold in the fresh
fillet market, and the purpose of harvesting whole fish is to
produce fillets. Furthermore. the Commission noted that there
appeared to be some informal economic integration, because
testimony was introduced which stated that a majority of New
England fish is sold through reciprocal arrangements between
harvesters and processors . Finally. the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative was cited as an example of economic
integration.
The outcome of the preliminary decision was very favorable to the North Atlantic Fisheries Task Force. 89 As
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discussed above, both fishermen and processors were included
in the domestic industry which produces fillets. The ITC
ruled that although pricing data was very sparse, "there was
a reasonable indication of a link between

alle~edly

unfair

imports (of whole fish)" . and material injury to U,S fisher-

men:

(emphasis added), Although the ITC sent questionnaires

to 40 processors, it was unable to reach a conclusion on
material injury by reason of imported fillets, because of a
lack of usable or returned questionnaires,

However, the

Commission did determine that there was a reasonable
indication that the U.S. industry

producin~

fillets

(fishermen 8 processors) was threatened with material injury,
which results in the same outcome as an actual material
injury determination. Therefore, the preliminary ITA subsidy
calculation of 6 ,85% was applied to

~

imported whole fish

and fillets, in the ITC preliminary rUling.
Such reasoning was not to carryover into the ITC final
decision. eO Regardless of Mr. Fisher's and Vice-Chairman
Liebeler's contention, the Commission focused upon the second
prong of the test, and found that the requisite commonality
of economic interest between fishermen and processors did not
exist . Thus, harvesters were excluded from the domestic
industry which produces fillets.
In explaining the application of the two-prong test, the
International Trade Commission wrote that "each situation
must be examined on a case-by-case basis bearing in mind the
nature of the particular industry involved." After the
preliminary investigation, the Commission received new
information that the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative
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acts solely as a broker for the fish landed by its member
fishermen, rather than as a processor. Additionally, they
noted that there was no eVidence that informal supply
relationships between fishermen and processors were
widespread. Most conclusive, however, was the fact that
"strong opposition was expressed by the processors to the
petition ." That opposition indicated to the ITC that
"harvesters and processors have differing interests and do
not function as a single industry."

Reyiew of the leiislation

In its final determination then, the ITC defined the two
industries both separately and individually, according to the
specific "product" which each produces . Next, the ITC
examined both U.S. industries for the purpose of assessing
material injury, or a threat thereof. As discussed in the
first chapter, in order to impose a CVD the Commission must
affirmatively rule that : (1) the U.S. industry is
experiencing material injury and, (2) that the injury exists
by reason of the subsidized imports.
When assessing the presence of material injury, the ITC
considers, among other factors, trends in production, employment, wages, and profitability (Sec. 771 (7)(C)(iii)). In
this investigation, data from January 1982 to December 1985
was utilized.
In determining whether the injury was by reason of
Canadian imports, the Commission is required to examine a
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number of factors, including the volume of imports, the
effects of imports on domestic prices, and the impact of
imports on the domestic industry (Sec. 771 (7)(B)).
Evaluation of these factors involves a consideration of: (1)
whether or not the volume of imports, or increase in imports,
is significant, (2) whether there has been significant price
undercutting by the imported products, and (3) whether the
imports have otherwise depressed prices, or prevented price
increases (Sec. 771 (7)(C)(i)8(ii)).
Have the U.S. fishing and processing industries suffered
"ma t e r i a l injury" and, if so, has it been because of subsidized Canadian imports? By highlighting the opposing arguments, this question may be put into perspective. Then, those
arguments which ultimately persuaded the ITC will be
explained.

Petitioner's

Ar~ument

Counsel for the North Atlantic Fisheries Task Force
stressed the fact that imports of whole fish and fillets have
increased at an accelerated rate in terms of volume, value,
and as a percentage of domestic consumption. 91 Even when
U.S. landings were at a cyclical peak in 1983, imports from
Canada still increased. Rather than just complementing U.S.
landings during temporary shortages of domestic supplies,
imports have consistently risen over the past five years.
Appendices G, H, and I illustrate this .
If prices are a function of supply and demand, then any

TABLE 6

Final Arguments

~efore

Petitioner's Allegations
J.

Subeidie. slgplClclntly aeduce
CCMlt. of canadlln F1ell1ftlJ Indu.try

the ITC
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I.

Effect on fi.hiftlJ indu.try COlt• •lni'll. Se.erll
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.-aUtr. 18 "Idence 01 undeneUlng in pric. . of
CGIIparable U.S. Ind canadi", product.

V.

M.ited head-to-heed cOllpltition In certlln O.S.
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source: ITC pre-hearing brief of the American Seafood Distributor's
Association (25 ~larch 1986).
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declining wages paid to their crews. Credit has become
difficult to obtain as the resale value of vessels has
dramatically dropped. Processors, it was alleged, have also
lost sales to Canadian fillets, as they tried to confirm with
submissions presented by domestic buyers .
An econometric study entitled "Partial Adjustment Price
Models: A Study of the Impact of Fish Imports on Ex-Vessel
Prices of New England Fishermen" by D.H. Wang and V.J.
Norton, as modified by Dr. Merrill Bateman of Commodity
Information Inc., was submitted as evidence of these
allegations by the Petitioners. 92 Bateman acknowledged that
the original econometric model , as developed and utilized by
wang and Norton, contained some fundamental flaws. Therefore,
he claimed to have corrected these flaws in his adaptation,
which predicted that U.S. ex-vessel prices would be 20% to
30% higher without the increase in Canadian imports from 1980
to 1985. The study then estimated that the total amount of
revenue lost by the New England fleet because of imports was
approximately $30 million in 1984, or between $28,000 to
$50,000 per vessel.
With regards to the threat of material injury, the Task
Force stated that there was every indication that, because
Canadian stock projections forecast increased landings, these
landings would ultimately be sold in the United States and
cause future injury.
The Task Force emphasized that, unlike a Section 201
investigation, subsidized imports need only be a contributing
cause of injury, and not the leading cause. Finally, in
answering questions conoerning a lack of response on beh&1f
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of domestic processors to ITC questionnaires, they stated
that the only reason why some U.S . processors had failed to
respond was because of pressure from Canadian suppliers , who
had threatened to eliminate shipments of whole fish if U.S.
processors cooperated with the ITC in the investigation. The
NAFTF said that most U.S . processors continued to support the
petition against Canadian fillets.

Respondent's Areument

Conversely, the Fisheries Council of Canada (FCC)
contended that declining stocks , due to overfishing and poor
management , were the overwhelming cause of any injury to the
U.S. fishing and processing industries . 93 Canadian imports
have therefore only filled an inevitable gap between the
declining U.S . supply and an increasing U.S demand (see
Appendix

J) .

Because American fishermen are not catching the

amount of fish that they did five or ten years ago, Canadian
fish has enabled the seafood marketing industry to expand,
thereby increasing the demand for both U.S and imported fish .
In this manner , imports of whole fish actually help U.S
processors . This, in turn, helps U.S fishermen by maintaining
their buyers Viability during periods of low domestic landings. Imports, then, help to smooth out the peaks and valleys
in U.S landings . As proof of this , the FCC noted that even
with increased imports of Canadian fish, there has been no
overall increase in U.S . supply over the last few years (see
AppendiX K).
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The argument presented by the PCC recieved additional
support from a submission by the American Seafood
Distributors Association (ASDA), another group which opposed
the petition. In refuting Bateman's econometric study, Perry
Quick, the economist employed by the ASDA, stated:
While econometric studies can be helpful
in many cases, the problems (in Bateman's
study) with model specification, inadequate
data, and poor applicability are too great
to allow usable results ... Bateman failed to
reveal that attempts to estimate retail demand elasticities for fish are notoriously
futile. Most have wrong signs and are generally considered by experts to be unusable.
Given all these problems, ... plus the fact
that the predictions are at odds with reality,
there is no question that the petitioner's
econo~~tric study is not relevant to this
case.
Another aspect of the Respondent's argument maintained
that Canadian government subsidies had not caused an increase
in imports from Canada, because total Canadian supply is
limited by fisheries management quotas. These quotas,
determined scientifically, therefore effectively nullify the
impact of Canadian subsidies on U.S. fishermen by restricting
Canadian output. The validity of this argument, however, was
never pursued because it was not applicable under U.S.
statutes, which only require the actual imports, and not the
subsidies, to be a cause of material injury.
The Respondents further alleged that because of the
increased demand for seafood, U.S. fishermen and processors
have been able to sell their entire output at record prices .
The only way to maintain this high demand, they said, was to
use Canadian fish, as prices for fresh fish are already at or
near their ceilings. Given the significant rise in fish
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prices in recent years, it is unlikely that U.S. consumers
will tolerate further large increases when prices for
alternative protein sources, such as poultry, are declining.
Thus, there is no evidence of price depression, suppression,
or lost sales.
Nor is there evidence of price undercutting. Any alleged
price differentials may be attributed to differences in
yield, size, freshness, packaging, and other factors. Therefore, direct price comparisons are difficult to make. Because
Canadian imports are always at least a day older than U.S.
fish, they inevitably command a lower price. The Counsel for
the FCC further alleged that the Boston auction price was not
suitable for meaningful price comparisons either, because it
is representative of only top quality fish purchased by a
select clientele. Moreover, in the fresh fish market, all
sellers are "price takers" with no power to set the marketclearing price. In such a market it would be irrational for
sellers to accept anything less than the market-clearing
price. There is no deliberate underselling by the Canadians
for the purpose of penetrating new U.S. markets (Table 6
graphically illustrates this argument).95
According to the FCC, material injury is simply not
present. First, the number of fishing vessels increased
between 1983 and 1985. Likewise, the number of processing
plants increased from 97 in 1979 to 110 in 1983. Finally,
prices are at historic highs. The only explanation for this,
considering the decline in landings, is because of the
availability of Canadian fish to maintain consumer demand.
There is also no indication of a threat of material
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(11), this split vote was deemed an affirmative determination. 97 On the other hand, the U.S. ITC unanimously
determined that the processing industry had not experienced
"material injury" by reason of Canadian fillets.

Considering

the intricate financial structure of the New England fishing
industry, these ITC final determinations were rather
simplistic and straightforward. The ITC is supposed to use
the ":best available information" in order to assess the
impact of subsidized imports on a domestic industry. It is
questionable whether the Commission adhered to this mandate.
The following subsections will discuss the two rulings.
Remember, decisions were handed down for both whole fish and
fillets.

Haryesters
Questionnaires were sent to 114 New England vessel
owners. Approximately 78 owners responded. The ITC considered
this response rate to be "particularly good ... in light of the
nature of (the fishing) industry". However, only 28 furnished
usable income-and-loss data. From these 28 vessels, the
Commission extracted the following information: 98

* Although the total number of vessels increased
slightly, primary employment on fishing vessels
decreased by 10~ :between 1983 and 1985.
* Expenses exceeded gross revenues in all three
reporting years, increasing from 101.5~ of gross
revenue in 1983 to 106.6~ in 1985.
* Cash flow (net loss before taxes plus depreciation expense) declined from $.95 million in 1983
to $.55 million in 1985.
* Net losses :before taxes as a percent of gross
revenue increased from 1.~ in 1983 to 7.1~ in
1985.
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* Of the 28 vessels that responded. 20 reported
losses in all three years.
This information indicated that New England groundfish
harvesters were experiencing material injury. The lTC's next
task was to ascertain whether this injury was "by reason of"
subsidized Canadian imports.
The Commission noted that imports of Canadian whole fish
increased from almost 36 million pounds in 1982 to 94 million
pounds in 1985. As a percent of domestic consumption. imports
rose from

8~

in 1982 to

22~

in 1985. Although the weighted-

average prices for Canadian whole fish did not reveal a
constant differential from corresponding U.S. prices. they
were "more often less than the U.S. price than they were
above it" (see Appendix L). Additionally. there was "some
evidence of underselling" by Canadian imports during the end
of 1984 and throughout 1985. Although arguments were made
regarding quality distinctions between Canadian and domestic
whole fish. the International Trade Commission was unable to
specifically quantify these differences.
The lTC acknowledged that the reduction in landings
contributed to an inorease in the average value of U.S.
landings from S.40/lb in 1982 to $.53/lb in 1985. However.
based largely upon a simple supply and demand relationship.
the Commission stated that "when imports increase ... U.S.
prooessors faoe an additional source of supply and are less
willing to pay higher prices for domestic fish." Therefore.
Can&d1an 1mports have aoted to suppress pr10e 1ncreases wh1ch
would have normally oooured because of the decline 1n

a

1&n41n s. Stated otherWise. U.S. ex-vessel prices for whole
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groundfish are lower than they would have been

withou~ \he

increase in Canadian imports.
There is no doubt that reduced commercial landings have
contributed to the recent economic difficulties exper18Dced
by the Northeast fishing fleet. Notwithstanding this.

\he

Commission is required by statute and legislative history.
only to determine whether subsidized imports oonstitute Qne
of pQssibly many causes of material inJury. 99 The ITC felt
that the reduction in landings made the U.S. industry even
more vulnerable to injury than usual. In conclusion.

i~

was

decided that U.S. groundfish harvesters had experienced
"material injury by reason of subsidized imports" because
Canadian whole groundfish acts to "suppress to some degreeincreases in U.S. ex-vessel prices. and because there vas
"some evidence of underselling" by these imports.

Prooessors
During the final investigation. the Commission mailed
questionnaires to 97 processors in an attempt to gather
information their operations. However. only a handful Qf
usable responses were received by the specified return date.
A shortened version of the questionnare was then sent to a
majority of the original 97 prooessors. along with a letter
explaining the need for the information. Additionally, the
ITC sent a team of investigators to the Boston Seafood Show
to emphasize the importanoe of returning the questionnaires.
Finally. the Commission was foroed tQ subpoena a number of
the larger prooessors in order to get just a minimum of data.
MQreover. throughQut the investigation they received
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statements from a significant number of processors who
expressed their unconditional opposition to the petition.
As a result of the failure of processors to return the
questionnaires, and their "overwhelming, unconditional
opposition ... to the petition," the ITC felt compelled to draw
the adverse inference that processors did not seek the help
of the Commission in combatting unfairly traded Canadian
fillets . Their decision was, therefore, negative.
Had the Commission not drawn an adverse inference, they
emphasized that their decision would still have been
negative. There was no evidence that U.S. processors were
experiencing material injury, or threatened with material
injury. Domestic fillet production increased consistently
over the reporting period. Net sales were up from $92 .8
million in 1982 to $109.3 million in 1985. Finally, the
data which was submitted indicated increased sales, profits,
and cash flow. Furthermore, in 1984 and 1985 only one firm
reported an operating loss .
The fact that domestic processors performed better
financially at a time when imports were continually rising
also ruled out the possibility that the processing industry
was threatened with material injury by future imports.
Accordingly, the ITC made another negative determination.
Therefore, the final

counteryailin~

duty of 5.82\ was lifted

from Canadian fillets. and would only apply to imports of
fresh. whole. Canadian

~roundfish.

It is somewhat ironic that the ITC found two separate
domestic industries, and imposed the duty only on whole
groundfish. Because the ITA calculated one duty for both

-118-

products-- whole fish M fi11ets-- the final duty on whole
fish also includes subsidies granted to Canadian processors
for fillet production.

Appeal of ITC Whole Groundfish Deoision

Shortly after the ITC final determination in Kay 1986,
the Task Force for the Survival of U.S. Fishermen, Processors
and Jobs (Survival Task Force), Ocean Fresh Seafood Inc., and
Empire Fish Co. filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of International Trade to protest the final ITC decision on whole
fish. Basically the group, represented by Heald and Beasley
of Providence, R.I., questioned the two key findings-- that
Canadian fish suppresses U.S . prices and, that Canadian fish
undersells U.S. fish.
The Appellants alleged that the ITC final decision was
not in accordance with the law because the Commission did not
establish that there was siinifioant undercutting or price
suppression (Sec. 771(7)(C)(ii)). Instead, their decision was
only based upon "some" evidence of underselling and the
assumption that imports suppressed prices "to some degree ."
Furthermore . they argued that the Commission did not use
meaningful price comparisons in their finding of underselling
because U.S. "market" cod is larger than Canadian "market

N

cod, and because the Boston auction price is almost always
higher than prices received in other ports. Finally. they
alleged that there was not substantial evidence of price
suppression. If there exists a ceiling on how far whole
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groundfish prices can increase, it is because of consumer
price resistance at the retail level, and not because of
imports of Canadian whole groundfish.
The outcome of the Appeal is uncertain at present. 100
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CONCLUSION

The study of Marine Affairs almost always requires a
multidisciplinary approach when addressing an ocean-related
issue or problem. In this thesis, the imposition of a
countervailing duty on imports of Canadian groundfish has
been approached from a legal, political, social, and economic
perspective. The object of the exercise has been to derive a
conclusion based upon this multidisciplinary analysis. Therefore. because of the broad scope of material which has been
presented, several observations will be discussed in order to
more fully understand the significance of the countervailing
duty investigation against Canadian groundfish.
In this concluding chapter, the issues which were
addressed in each chapter will be briefly reexamined, in
light of the outcome of the CVD case. Then, a final section
will be devoted to discussing the future implications which
might be expected as a result.
Chapter one reviewed the evolution of countervailing
duties in order to emphasize the difficulty involved with
reaching an international consensus on what constitutes fair
competition and acceptable government intervention in the
market. During the 1970's, as nations increasingly resorted
to subsidizing their industries to achieve social and
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political objectives, importing nations frequently employed
countervailing duties as a retaliatory device. The 1979 GATT
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties represented
a major advance in the standardization and interpretation of
the rules governing these activities. However, the GATT
Subsidies Code was unable to develop a precise definition of
the two key elements-- subsidization and material injury.
By reexamining how the ITA and the ITC interpreted these
two elements, it becomes apparent that there is not likely to
ever be a consensus on these definitions. Decisions will
continue to require extensive litigation as more precedent
develops to accommodate the wide variety of practices which
might be considered "subsidies," or to determine the role of
imports in the domestic economy.
For example, consider the difficulty involved in determining whether unemployment benefits available to Canadian
fishermen constitute a subsidy. The program regUlarly provides between 13% and 32% of the annual income of these
fishermen. Quite feasibly, this helps to increase revenues,
sustain employment, and perhaps increase production. Yet,
these benefits were not countervailed because they were
deemed a "service" which was not provided on preferential
terms. The arguments both for and opposed to countervailing
this particular program seem to be equally valid. In the end,
the ITA chose a narrow interpretation of the law. The
appropriateness of this decision is debatable.
The existence of material injury is usually predicated
upon some combination of declining profits, low capacity
utilization, or falling employment. The "causation standard"
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is satisfied by showing an increase in imports, a rising
market share of imports. price undercutting, price depression
and/or price suppression.
The ITC injury determination was disappointing. It was
based only upon some sketchy evidence of price suppression
and price undercutting. This serves to exemplify the
variability involved with defining material injury. The term
"sketchy" is used because the ITC decision relied upon
questionnaires from only 28 vessel owners. The ITC merely
acknowledged that U.S. ex-vessel prices would be higher
without the rapid increase in Canadian imports. With U.S.
ex-vessel prices already at historic highs. it is logical to
ask how much higher they can rise before consumers switch to
cheaper protein substitutes. The determination of price
suppression then, was only based upon a simple supply
relationship which assumes that any increase in imports will
lower domestic prices to some degree. Also, while the ITC
cited several examples of underselling. it disregarded the
argument that Canadian imports were of inferior quality. With
so many factors figuring into ex-vessel prices, it would seem
difficult to verify any undercutting. Although the Commission
may not have fUlly taken into account the economic studies
which were presented as evidence in the case, it cannot
necessarily be faulted. The economic structure of the fishing
industry is quite unique. Given the short period in which the
ITC has to reach a decision, an accurate, detailed analysis
may have been impossible. Needless to say, the outcome of the
appeal will be eagerly anticipated, as it may clarify many of
the economic concepts which were neglected in the actual
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countervailing duty investigation.
The decisive factor in the Commission's decision may
have been the fact that Canadian imports of whole fish did
not need to be the leading cause of economic hardship to U.S.
fishermen. In this respect, "material injury" is not a
particularly high trade impact standard . U.S. fishermen were
experiencing economic distress at a time when imports were
rapidly increasing. The ITC determination was therefore
affirmative.
As far as the lasting implications of this case are
concerned, the definition of the seemingly simple term
"domestic industry" played a crucial role. Since the final
duty is only applicable to imports of whole fish, there is
reason to suspect that Canada will increase its efforts at
directly marketing fillets to the U.S . market. If this
occurs, it would seem that both U.S. processors and harvesters would be adversely affected. As processors begin to
compete with increased shipments of potentially lower-priced
fresh fillets, they might be foroed to lower their ex-vessel
prices to fishermen. Perhaps the "two-prong test" was not
applied in the most economically effective manner. The
consequences could be severe.
The rules for imposing a countervailing duty are indeed
very flexible. Different situations dictate different interpretations. The likelihood of eliminating the uncertainty
surrounding an investigation is therefore small. Beyond this,
the GATT still contains several confusing provisions whioh
must either be clarified or eliminated. The inadequacy of
these provisions became apparent in the groundfish case.
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For example, GATT continues to differentiate between the
treatment of primary and non-primary products. Supposedly,
primary products are those from the "farm, forest, and
fishery." Certain types of domestic and export subsidization
are allowed so long as they do not result in "providing more
than an equitable share of world trade" in that product. Yet,
countervailing duties have reoently been imposed on Canadian
whole groundfish, U.S. corn, and preliminarily on imports of
Canadian softwoods. 101 Obviously, GATT has been neglected
or conveniently sidestepped. These rules need to be revised.
Finally, both the United States and Canada disregarded
the GATT rules calling for consultations for the purpose of
reducing or eliminating subsidies which cause "prejudice" to
the trading interests of other nations. This rule has
historically been neglected as there is little incentive
under GATT to pursue these negotiations. A countervailing
duty is usually chosen instead, because of the more tangible
outcome . This is unfortunate because consultations would
probably result in less animosity between trading partners .
Chapter two attempted to situate the countervailing duty
case into the larger context of U.S. - Canadian trade
relations. The successful imposition of a duty on imports of
whole Canadian groundfish will probably be detrimental to
current efforts aimed at reaching a free trade arrangement
between the two nations, and also at developing a cooperative
fisheries management regime. Furthermore, it escalates the
United States one step closer to an all-out trade war with
our neighbors to the North. Consider that duties have
recently been levied on Canadian shakes and shingles, certain
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U.S. paper products, Canadian fish, U.S. corn, and Canadian
softwoods. In this retaliatory environment, discussions of
free trade assume great importance. After all, if the world's
largest two trading partners. both of whom advocate "free
trade" or at least "fair trade," cannot settle their disputes
in a satisfactory manner, then what hope is left for the rest
of the world?
If an agreement can be negotiated, then what sort of
role will fisheries play? Both nations must realize that
fisheries management and fisheries trade are inter-related
concepts before embarking on purely trade related
discussions. Especially with regards to shared stocks, there
exists an opportunity for finally reaching some meaningful
agreements. Perhaps the realities of trade will force
officials from both nations to recognize the need for
cooperative fisheries management. It will then be the
responsibility of industry representatives to get their views
upon the negotiating table. Because New England fishermen and
processors stand to lose the most from reducing trade
barriers. they will probably

be

the most vocal. That is why

non-tariff issues such as the countervailing duty will play
an important role. It is very possible that a wide range of
mutually important fisheries issues will be discussed. Only
then mayan equitable decision

be

reached which will not

result in regional trade imbalances.
Chapter three presented an overview of other imported
seafood products which may

be

subject to future trade

restrictions by the United States. As illustrated by the
groundfish case however, it is difficult to predict the
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outcome of an investigation. Because of the complexity of the
legislation. a case may turn on any number of very specific
regulations. For instance, had the ITA included unemployment
benefits as a subsidy. and if the ITC defined the industry
producing fillets as including both harvesters and
processors. then a duty as high as 15% may have been imposed
on both whole fish and fillets. thereby having an even more
dramatic impact on the entire groundfish supply situation.
Therefore, each case must be analyzed upon its own
merits. bearing in mind the situations confronting the
industries in both the importing and exporting nations. The
rules will vary according to the unfair trade practices which
are involved (subsidization. dumping. etc.). Most likely. the
Canadian groundfish case will be helpful in illustrating the
types of activities which might be held countervailable in
other fishing sectors. Vessel assistance such as low interest
loans and direct grants are countervailable. Likewise. any
assistance which is provided exclusively to fishermen or
processors will probably qualify . The conclusion of chapter
five explains about illegal "subsidies" in greater detail.
Also. as mentioned in chapter three. the groundfish case
will probably be most useful for determining the likelihood
of imposing duties on other seafood imports from Canada. Many
of the subsidies may be the same. so the injury question will
be

critical. The conclusion of chapter six explores the

meaning of "material injury" at length.
Without doubt. the United States and Canada maintain
different philosophies regarding the development of their
fishing industries. The U.S. relies more upon private
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initiatives, whereas Canada engages in more government intervention. These two philosophies clash in the U.S. marketplace. The countervailing duty was supposed to restore some
degree of fairness back to this competition. Will a

5.82~

duty on whole Canadian groundfish ensure the desired "level
playing field?" Who really gained from the decision and who
lost? Finally, what other implications does this case hold
for the future, which have not already been discussed? These
questions will be addressed in the remaining few paragraphs.
It initially appears as if the outcome of the investigation is a "worst-case" situation for the U.S. industry,
especially processors. First, a

5 .82~

duty is probably too

small to significantly stem the flow of whole groundfish into
the U.S. market . Likewise, it is also probably too small to
raise U.S. ex-vessel prices significantly. These statements
must be qualified however, by mentioning that it will take
time before economists sort out the impact of the duty.
Without question, U.S. processors "shot themselves in
the foot" by unconditionally opposing the petition. Now they
must contend with higher prices for their raw product, and
possibly increased competition from imported Canadian
fillets. Any increased costs will likely be passed on to U.S .
consumers, and perhaps reduce demand at the retail level.
Again, expect future economic studies to document these
trends.
Obviously, it has become increasingly difficult to refer
to U.S . fishermen and processors as simply the "fishing
industry." The case illustrated the animosity between them,
and their mutual distrust of one another. Had both groups
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supported the petition, the result may have been more
favorable to both of them.
In a similar manner, Canadian and U.S. fishermen are
probably more angry with each other than ever before. The
boundary dispute. declining stocks. and a countervailing duty
are the result of a continuing failure to discuss mutual
problems which affect these two industries. The need for
cooperative solutions to these problems is obvious.
The investigation did have a few positive results.
however. Because both nations were forced to deal with the
problem. a large amount of data was generated which might be
useful in future studies and decision-making. Also. because
of the success of the petition. albeit limited. Canada might
continue to reduce the subsidies it provides to its fishing
industry. In terms of economic efficiency. this would be the
ideal outcome.
Finally. the North Atlantic Fisheries Task Force must be
applauded for an outstanding job of raising money and gaining
the support and unity of U.S. fishermen along the northeastern coast. Although the actual duty was small. the symbolic
victory achieved by this group was enormous. It cost between
$300.000 and $700.000 to take the case to its conclusion. 102 Raising this amount of money was no small task.
Everyone involved with the Task Force effort showed great
pride and perseverence. It illustrates what can happen when
individualists like fishermen set aside their differences and
work for the common good of the group. In this respect. the
Canadian groundfish countervailing duty investigation ignited
a spark of optimism for the future of U.S. fisheries.
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Unfortunately, there have been few other reasons to feel
optimistic about the future of U.S. fisheries in recent
years. Any sign of unity amongst American fishermen is
positive. indeed. The government of Canada has shown that it
is deeply committed to the development of its fishing
industry. A glance at the programs which they have initiated
indicates a progressive, future-oriented attitude towards
this development. With the government's encouragement,
Canadian fishermen are now emphasizing the improved quality
of their catch. increased safety on their vessels. and the
use of sophisticated techniques in the market.
Simultaneously, the Canadian government has assumed its
responsibility by authoritatively managing the fishery
resources in an attempt to ensure their continued
development.
U.S. fishermen, processors and government officials must
take notice of this occurence, because the days of "business
as usual" are over. With domestic landings down and demand
up, imports are inevitable. Nevertheless. America is blessed
with the largest Exclusive Economic Zone on earth. In 1983,
however, the Nation imported $5.1 billion worth of fishery
products. This represents an increase of $2,8 billion over
1976 when the U.S. enacted the Magnuson Act for the purpose
of, among other things, reducing our dependence on fishery
imports. 103 The challenge is apparent. The United States
fishing industry must aggressively develop and maintain new
or existing markets for its products, while the government
must manage our fish stocks far more effectively than it has
in recent years. The realities of international trade and
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B

Case History
August 5, 1985-

Petition recieved by the ITA and the ITC.

August 14, 1985- Notice of the institutuion of ITC investigation
701-TA-257 is published in the Federal Register
(50 FR 32775).
August 26, 1985- ITA initiates investigation C-122-507 (50 FR 35281),
August 28, 1985- ITC pUblic conference is held in Washington D.C.
Sept. 9, 1985-

ITA presents Canada with a questionairre concerning
the allegations in the petition.

Sept. 11, 1985-

ITC preliminarily determines that there is a
"reasonable indication of material injury" from
imports of fresh Canadian whole fish, and an
indication of a threat of material injury from
imports of fresh Canadian fillets (50 FR 38904,
Sept. 19, 1985).

Oct. 7, 1985-

ITA postpones preliminary determination to no
later than January 2, 1986 upon request of the
petitioner (50 FR 41921).

Sept. - Dec.
1985-

,

ITA recieves responses to questionairre from
Canada.

Jan. 2, 1986-

ITA preliminary subsidy determination of 6.85'
announced (51 FR 1010, January 9, 1986).

Jan. 9, 1986-

ITC initiates investigation 701-TA-257 (final).

Jan. - Feb.
1986-

ITA verifies information from Government of Canada.

Feb. 13, 1986-

IT~

March 24, 1986-

I'rA final subsidy determination of 5.82\ (51 FR 10041).

Apr11 1, 1986-

!TC public hearing held in Washington D.C.

May, 1986-

ITC final
injury by
ITC final
reason of

July, 1986-

Appeal filed with U.S. Court of Int~rnational Trade
by the Task Force for the Survival of u.S. Fishermen,
Processing Plants and Jobs; Ocean Fresh Sea Food, Inc.;
and Empire Fish Co. They protested the final ITC
4ecision on whole groundfish.

public hearing held in Washington D.C.

affirmative determination of material
reason of imported fresh Whole groundfish.
negative determination of injury by
imported fresh groundish fillets.

APPENDIX C (cant.)
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A loan guarantee by the government to a creditworthy
constitutes a subsidy to the extent that the guarantee
assures more favourable terms on a loan. The amount of the
subsidy is determined by comparing the cost of a government
loan guarantee with the cost of commercial guarantees.
Long-term loans for companies considered
uncreditworthy--- To determine the creditworthiness of a
company, the ITA will analyze its present and past health as
reflected in various financial indicators calculated from
financial statements. accounts, market studies, economic
forecasts, and loan appraisals. They next construct a loan
type calculation using a suitable risk premium as the
benchmark. This risk premium will supposedly provide a
meaningful measure of the value of government support in
obtaining loans for uncreditworthy companies.
Short-term 10ans--- To determine the commercial
soundness of short-term loans, the ITA will compare the terms
of the loan at issue with a benchmark loan. The benchmark
loan is to be based upon the appropriate national average
commercial method for financing short term loans, rather than
the company specific method. Because short-term loans are
received and repaid within a year, the ITA allocates the
benefits to one year only. There is no difference in the
treatment of creditworthy and uncreditworthy companies when
calculating the benefits of short-term loans.
Foriiyeness of Pebt- Where the government has permanently
assumed or forgiven an outstanding debt obligation, the ITA
will treat this as a grant to the company equal to the
outstanding principle at the time of the assumption or
forgiveness.
Where debt has been converted into government equity,
the value of the remaining principle will be treated as an
equity infusion, described below.
Goyernment Equity Inyestments- Government ownership confers
a subsidy only when it is on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations. Therefore. a subsidy will arise if
the government pays more than the prevailing market price. If
no market price exists, the ITA will determine the soundness
of the equity infusion by examining financial statements,
accounts, rates of return on equity, market studies, economic
forecasts, and loan appraisals.
If the equity purchase is deemed inconsistent with
commercial considerations, the ITA measures the benefit by
multiplying the difference between the rate of return on the
government's equity and the national average rate for the
review period by the total amount of all equity purchases
made in years during which the company was considered
uncreditworthy.
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APPENDIX D
Differenoes in Calculating A4 valorea Subsidy
LQans M Guarantees
The ITA "Subsidies Appendix" states that fQr a
creditwQrthy cQmpany, the value Qf the subsidy cQnferred by a
lQan is equal tQ the difference between the rates paid Qn a
cQmmercial lQan and thQse paid Qn the gQvernment lQan. LQans
and guarantees made tQ an uncreditwQrthy cQmpany are
cQnsidered tQ be the equivalent Qf an equity investment and
treated as such.
The EC view is that a lQan Qr guarantee which has
cQnditiQns attached tQ it is nQt a subsidy. These cQnditiQns.
which usually require a cQmpany tQ lQcate in a higher CQst
regiQn, shQuld be allQwed tQ Qffset the lQwer CQst Qf the
gQvernment lQan. Very few Qffsets are permitted under u .S.
law.
GQyernment Equity Inyestments
Canada and the EC maintain that a subsidy exists Qnly if
the funds used by the gQvernment tQ make an equity investment
were Qbtained belQW the gQvernments nQrmal CQst Qf mQney.
This pQsitiQn is based upQn a GATT prQvisiQn relating tQ
expQrt credits prQvided at Qr abQve the gQvernment's CQst Qf
mQney. Any subsidy under these circumstances is calculated as
the amQunt Qf the difference between the gQvernment's actual
CQst Qf mQney in the particular case and the nQrmal CQst Qf
mQney.
In the United States, a subsidy exists tQ the extent
that the gQvernment purchase Qf equity was at prices higher
than market prices, Qr (if nQ market fQr the shares existed)
if the return tQ the gQvernment was less than the average
rate Qf return in the eCQnQmy.
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previ~u7 Agricultural and Fisheries Investigations
Def~n~ng the Scope of the Domestic Industry

~:

Agricultural Investigations
A. First-Tier Producers Were Included in:
~Certain
I~v . ~o.

Red Raspberries from Canada" (Rasp~er=ies),
731TA-196 (Prelininar~), USITC Pu~. 1565 (1984)
and 1707 (Final) (1985);

"Lanb ~eat from ~ew Zealand" (Lamb r':eat), 1:1V. :':0. 701TA-80 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. 1191, and I~vs. ::os.
701-T~-214 and 731-TA-184 (Preli~i~a~y), GSITC Pub. 1534
(1984);
"Frozen Concentratec. Orange Juice frcDl Brazil" (Orar-.ge
Juice), Inv. No. 701-TA-84 (Preliminar1), USITC Pub. 1283
(1982) and 1406 (Final) (1983);
"Sugar from t:1e 2uro?ean Commun i, t::.:·"
104-~_~;-7, USITC Pub. 1247
(1981).

3.

?i~st-Tier

Producers Were not

(Sugar),

I~1V.

:~o.

Inclu~ec. ~~:

"Certain Table Wines from France and Italy" (Table Wines) ,
Invs. ~os. 70l-TA-210-211 (?relimi~ary), CSITC Pub. 1502
(984);
"Frozen French Fries from Cacada", Inv. No. 731-TA-3
(Preliminary), USITC Pub.1259 (1982);
"Instant Potato Granules from Ca.-lac.a", I!1v.
USITC Pub. 509 (1972);

~o.

"Live Swine and Pork from Canada" (Swi~€), Inv.
701-'rA-224 (Final), USITC ?ub. 1733 (1985);

A~1921-97,

~o.

"Canned ,~an3 and Shoulders from :elg Lum, :Je:".ma=~, -::he
Federal Republic of Germany, France, I~clan~, Italy,
Luxembourg, the ~~et~1erlanc3, and the Uni ted :a::1gc.o~,
Invs. Nos. 701-TA-31-39 (Final), USITC Pub. 1082 (1980).
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APPENDIX F (cont.)
2:

Fisheries Investigations
A. First-Tier Producers Were Included in:

"Fish, Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen, Whether or not Whole,
but not Otherwise Prepared or Preserved from Canada"
' I nv . No. 701-TA-40 (Final) ,USITC Pub. 1066 (1980);
"Certain Fish and Shellfish from Canada" Inv. No.
303-TA-9, USITC Pub. 966 (1979);
"Certain Canned Tuna Fish", Inv. No. TA-201-53, USITC
Pub. 1558 (1984);
"Groundfish Fillets", Report to the President on EscapeClause Investigation No. 25 Under the Provisions of
Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,
(1954);
"Groundfish Fillets", Report to the President on EscapeClause Investigation No. 47 Under the Provisions of
SeetIon 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act ..Q{:.li51,
as amended, (1956);
"Certain Fish", Inv. No. TA-201-41, USITC Pub. 1028
(1980) .
B. First-Tier Producers Were not Included in:

"Certain Dried Salted Codfish from Canada", Inv. No.
731-TA-199 (Final), USITC Pub. 1711 (1985);
"Hard-Smoked Herring Filets from Canada", Inv. No.
701-TA-82, USITC Pub. 1205 (1981).
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APPENDIX H
U.S. Imports of Fresh Fillets from Canada
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APPENDIX I
Total U.S. Imports of Groundfish from Canada
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APPENDIX J

u.s.

Landings vs. Imports
(Whole Fish)
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APPENDIX K
Composition of U.S. ~roundfish Supply *
(fresh cod, haddock, and flounder)

Totol Fill~t
l.-ports

o Totol
Wholl?
l-.ports

Mi II ions
of

pounds

IS!

Totol US
Landings

* fillets converted to whole
fish equivalents
I
~

I]

01 13 QZ 13 ID IJ D4 ,. 01 ,. QZ . . ID .. DC 15 01 15 III 15

11l
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a ., It

I

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce

APPENDIX L
Prices paid by U.S. processors for domestic and Canadian whole market
cod on the second Monday of each month, January 1984-December 1985.
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